Corporate Law and Governance Pluralism

Abstract For the past several decades, jurists have invested significant efforts in developing the law in general—and private law in particular—in terms of pluralism. However, the conceptualization of corporate law and governance according to pluralist principles rarely exists. This Essay is the first in the legal literature to address this deficiency by providing a unique pluralist theory of corporate governance regimes. It distinguishes between the plurality of corporate law’s sources, values, and principles, and discusses the implications for governance. Moreover, based on the social systems’ thinking and the framework of complexity, this Essay provides theoretical grounds for skepticism about any policies or structures applicable to all times and contexts. Therefore, rather than perceiving corporate governance as being identically applicable to all corporations, the law must meet the challenge of complexity by designing governance arrangements following a firm-specific perspective. Furthermore, I argue that in conditions of complexity, corporate governance eco-systems should be designed with a firm-specific view that incorporates the effect of the corporation participants’ heterogeneity, the heterogeneity of its internal power relations, and the heterogeneity of industries and markets. These novel arguments have profound implications for redesigning fundamental legal doctrines—such as fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders, regulation of related party transactions, the officers’ duty of care, and the company purpose.