Fact-Centric Political Theory, Three Ways: Normative Behaviourism, Grounded Normative Theory, and Radical Realism

In the last two decades, Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings – partly as a reaction against normative theorising centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief article begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (1) a nonideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (2) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of the article then compares and contrasts three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo.