{"title":"为外推的推论解释辩护","authors":"T. Baetu","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation\",\"authors\":\"T. Baetu\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44433,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation
ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.
期刊介绍:
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.