语言知识和激进的怀疑主义

Tomáš Čanal
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据笛卡尔的观点,我们可以成功地怀疑,在我们周围有外部世界,但仍然有语言,没有任何复杂的地方。根据维特根斯坦的观点,怀疑除了语言之外的一切外部世界,无非是怀疑包括语言在内的所有外部世界。为什么?没有哪个演讲者比他认为无懈可击的外在事物(例如,他有两只手和两只腿)更确定自己话语的含义。如果没有这种构成性的联系,就不会有明确意义的交流。维特根斯坦认为,在《第一哲学沉思录》的作者采用了邪恶骗子的假设之后,我们只是在处理语言(或阅读文本)的印象中。相反,我们处理的是一些截然不同的症状。本文的目的是批判性地重新评估维特根斯坦对持有这种激进怀疑立场的可能性的批评。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE AND A RADICAL SCEPTICISM
According to Descartes, it is possible to doubt successfully that there is external world, all around us, yet still to have language, in place, without any complication. According to Wittgenstein, to doubt everything about the external world except language means nothing more than to doubt everything about the external world including language. Why? No speaker is more certain about the meaning of his words than about the external things he believes to be unassailable (for example, that he has two hands and two legs). Without this constitutive connection there would be no communication of a definite sense. Wittgenstein suggests that, after the author of the Meditations on First Philosophy adopts the hypothesis of evil deceiver, we are only under the impression that we deal with language (or that we read a text). We instead deal with symptoms of something rather different. The objective of this paper is to critically reassess Wittgenstein’s criticism of the possibility of holding such a radical sceptical position.
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