{"title":"重罪犯、不法分子和侵权行为者对“不法行为”原告的棘手待遇","authors":"Nora Freeman Engstrom, R. Rabin","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0022","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two tort law tenets are broadly accepted. First, litigants are to be judged based on their conduct, not on their character. In tort law, if not in heaven, the sinner is entitled to the same treatment as the saint. Second, it’s also broadly understood that, as comparative negligence supplanted contributory fault in the latter years of the last century, compensation stopped being binary; recovery became proportional. When, as is very often the case, the plaintiff and the defendant both err, the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation is a matter of more or less, not yes or no. Against that backdrop, this Essay identifies four doctrines—the wrongful conduct rule, the “innocence” prerequisite to legal malpractice actions, the non-innocent party doctrine, and the complicity defense—that implicitly challenge both of these bedrock principles. We show how these “wrongdoer doctrines” extinguish claims, not just because of what the plaintiff has done but, rather, who the plaintiff is. And we also explore the doctrines’ other infirmities. Namely, these doctrines subvert the basic goals of tort law, authorize character assassination, defy consistent or principled application, rest on a false premise, and operate to resurrect a stealth version of contributory fault. Finally, this Essay, written for a symposium celebrating the great tort cases of the 21st century, highlights a recent opinion out of West Virginia that unmasked one such doctrine and appropriately relegated it to the dustbin of history.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Felons, Outlaws, and Tort’s Troubling Treatment of the “Wrongdoer” Plaintiff\",\"authors\":\"Nora Freeman Engstrom, R. Rabin\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/jtl-2023-0022\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Two tort law tenets are broadly accepted. First, litigants are to be judged based on their conduct, not on their character. In tort law, if not in heaven, the sinner is entitled to the same treatment as the saint. Second, it’s also broadly understood that, as comparative negligence supplanted contributory fault in the latter years of the last century, compensation stopped being binary; recovery became proportional. When, as is very often the case, the plaintiff and the defendant both err, the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation is a matter of more or less, not yes or no. Against that backdrop, this Essay identifies four doctrines—the wrongful conduct rule, the “innocence” prerequisite to legal malpractice actions, the non-innocent party doctrine, and the complicity defense—that implicitly challenge both of these bedrock principles. We show how these “wrongdoer doctrines” extinguish claims, not just because of what the plaintiff has done but, rather, who the plaintiff is. And we also explore the doctrines’ other infirmities. Namely, these doctrines subvert the basic goals of tort law, authorize character assassination, defy consistent or principled application, rest on a false premise, and operate to resurrect a stealth version of contributory fault. Finally, this Essay, written for a symposium celebrating the great tort cases of the 21st century, highlights a recent opinion out of West Virginia that unmasked one such doctrine and appropriately relegated it to the dustbin of history.\",\"PeriodicalId\":39054,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Tort Law\",\"volume\":\"0 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Tort Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0022\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Tort Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0022","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
Felons, Outlaws, and Tort’s Troubling Treatment of the “Wrongdoer” Plaintiff
Abstract Two tort law tenets are broadly accepted. First, litigants are to be judged based on their conduct, not on their character. In tort law, if not in heaven, the sinner is entitled to the same treatment as the saint. Second, it’s also broadly understood that, as comparative negligence supplanted contributory fault in the latter years of the last century, compensation stopped being binary; recovery became proportional. When, as is very often the case, the plaintiff and the defendant both err, the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation is a matter of more or less, not yes or no. Against that backdrop, this Essay identifies four doctrines—the wrongful conduct rule, the “innocence” prerequisite to legal malpractice actions, the non-innocent party doctrine, and the complicity defense—that implicitly challenge both of these bedrock principles. We show how these “wrongdoer doctrines” extinguish claims, not just because of what the plaintiff has done but, rather, who the plaintiff is. And we also explore the doctrines’ other infirmities. Namely, these doctrines subvert the basic goals of tort law, authorize character assassination, defy consistent or principled application, rest on a false premise, and operate to resurrect a stealth version of contributory fault. Finally, this Essay, written for a symposium celebrating the great tort cases of the 21st century, highlights a recent opinion out of West Virginia that unmasked one such doctrine and appropriately relegated it to the dustbin of history.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Tort Law aims to be the premier publisher of original articles about tort law. JTL is committed to methodological pluralism. The only peer-reviewed academic journal in the U.S. devoted to tort law, the Journal of Tort Law publishes cutting-edge scholarship in tort theory and jurisprudence from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives: comparative, doctrinal, economic, empirical, historical, philosophical, and policy-oriented. Founded by Jules Coleman (Yale) and some of the world''s most prominent tort scholars from the Harvard, Fordham, NYU, Yale, and University of Haifa law faculties, the journal is the premier source for original articles about tort law and jurisprudence.