{"title":"怀疑有神论：全景综述（上）","authors":"Luis R. G. Oliveira","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12947","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor‐made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen).","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part I)\",\"authors\":\"Luis R. G. Oliveira\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phc3.12947\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor‐made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen).\",\"PeriodicalId\":40011,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy Compass\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy Compass\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12947\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy Compass","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12947","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor‐made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen).
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