{"title":"关联贷款担保对债务成本的影响:来自韩国的证据","authors":"Yong-sang Woo","doi":"10.19030/jabr.v33i5.10021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A loan guarantee occurs when a company guarantees payment of an affiliate’s loan. Conflicting arguments regarding loan guarantees provided to affiliates have prevailed. First, some suggest that loan guarantees provided to affiliates would decrease firm value because they are contingent liabilities (Shim, 1996; Berkman, Cole & Fu, 2009). Second, others suggest firm value is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because loan guarantees would be regarded as a positive indicator of future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The purpose of this study was to present additional empirical evidence of these arguments. The result of this study showed that cost of debt is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because they regard loan guarantees as contingent liabilities. Therefore, this result supports the assertion that loan guarantees decrease firm value.","PeriodicalId":40064,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Business Research","volume":"33 1","pages":"993"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Effect Of Affiliate Loan Guarantees On Cost Of Debt: Evidence From Korea\",\"authors\":\"Yong-sang Woo\",\"doi\":\"10.19030/jabr.v33i5.10021\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A loan guarantee occurs when a company guarantees payment of an affiliate’s loan. Conflicting arguments regarding loan guarantees provided to affiliates have prevailed. First, some suggest that loan guarantees provided to affiliates would decrease firm value because they are contingent liabilities (Shim, 1996; Berkman, Cole & Fu, 2009). Second, others suggest firm value is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because loan guarantees would be regarded as a positive indicator of future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The purpose of this study was to present additional empirical evidence of these arguments. The result of this study showed that cost of debt is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because they regard loan guarantees as contingent liabilities. Therefore, this result supports the assertion that loan guarantees decrease firm value.\",\"PeriodicalId\":40064,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Applied Business Research\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"993\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-08-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Applied Business Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i5.10021\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Business Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i5.10021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Effect Of Affiliate Loan Guarantees On Cost Of Debt: Evidence From Korea
A loan guarantee occurs when a company guarantees payment of an affiliate’s loan. Conflicting arguments regarding loan guarantees provided to affiliates have prevailed. First, some suggest that loan guarantees provided to affiliates would decrease firm value because they are contingent liabilities (Shim, 1996; Berkman, Cole & Fu, 2009). Second, others suggest firm value is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because loan guarantees would be regarded as a positive indicator of future cash flow (Lee, 2005). The purpose of this study was to present additional empirical evidence of these arguments. The result of this study showed that cost of debt is high when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large. This result indicates that creditors demand higher risk premiums when the amount of loan guarantees provided to affiliates is large because they regard loan guarantees as contingent liabilities. Therefore, this result supports the assertion that loan guarantees decrease firm value.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) welcomes articles in all areas of applied business and economics research. Both theoretical and applied manuscripts will be considered for publication; however, theoretical manuscripts must provide a clear link to important and interesting business and economics applications. Using a wide range of research methods including statistical analysis, analytical work, case studies, field research, and historical analysis, articles examine significant applied business and economics research questions from a broad range of perspectives. The intention of JABR is to publish papers that significantly contribute to these fields.