{"title":"大卫·沃尔什,《人的优先权:政治、哲学和历史发现》","authors":"V. Ogle","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2021.1973303","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In his latest book, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries, David Walsh offers a collection of essays that flesh out his personalist vision.1 Separated into three parts, “The Political Discovery,” “The Philosophical Discovery,” and “The Historical Discovery,” the book celebrates what Walsh views as the greatest modern insight, the priority of the person, from a variety of angles. The result is a thoughtful and original series of mediations on the theme, and a welcome invitation to share in Walsh’s wonder at the phenomenon of personhood. Though wide-ranging in topic, the central message of these essays is that persons are always beyond what can be written about them on the page. In his introductory chapter, Walsh argues that the priority of the person is a distinctly modern idea, discovered thanks to the turn toward the subject. Though he notes that the concept itself originated with the Greek prosōpon, and was taken up into Christianity for theological purposes, Walsh argues that it was not until the modern era that the move establishing the priority of the person was made. This was the break with the previously “instinctive subordination of the individual to the whole,” which he associates with liberalism, a political phenomenon founded on the conviction that the individual cannot be so subordinated (p. 3). Giving a historical overview of the political philosophers who paved the way for its emergence, Walsh shows how their endeavors were held back by their conception of human beings as individuals, a thin idea that failed to account for the relationality of personhood. Indeed, even today, Walsh argues, a philosophy of the person has yet to be fully worked out. Calling for such an eventuality, he spends the rest of the book fleshing out a history of why it has yet to be achieved. In section one, which follows the introductory chapter, Walsh zeroes in on the political discovery of the priority of the person. In arguing that the political discovery preceded the philosophical one, Walsh follows Hegel’s famous Owl of Minerva adage, suggesting that philosophy is always a reflection upon practices already in place. For Walsh, liberal democracy not only has a practical priority, but it also works better in practice than theory; indeed, he argues, liberal theorists still cannot account for the personhood they instinctively seek to protect. Ultimately, liberalism is noteworthy for its fundamental intuition, which is in accord with the true nature of the person. Indeed, for this reason, Walsh considers the emergence of liberalism in history to be almost fated, going so far as to suggest that democracy is prior to history. Because I found this claim especially puzzling, I will try to unpack its logic. Walsh, as I have said, argues that liberalism is a great achievement because it is rooted in a true conviction about the person. This, I think, is why he argues that “... so long as the democratic impulse lives within a single individual it has achieved its reality” (p. 72). Reflecting on liberalism, then, his interest seems less in the nitty-gritty of a given regime’s functionality and more on the emergence of a form of government which is consonant with the dignity of the person. For Walsh, it is very important that human beings are able to engage in self-governance because it allows them to take on the responsibility toward which personhood is intrinsically oriented. Viewed from this perspective, all other forms of government emerge as infantilizing. Strikingly, Walsh suggests that political life is erected upon the possibility of self-gift, the same possibility that makes personhood so special. By endowing citizens with the responsibility of self-rule, then, liberal regimes get at this fundamental meaning of political life in a new way. This is not to say that liberal regimes are models of self-donation, but they are uniquely conditioned by the possibility of self-donation. This, I think, is what Walsh means when he writes that “success is irrelevant, for it has already been","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"50 1","pages":"229 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"David Walsh, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries\",\"authors\":\"V. Ogle\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10457097.2021.1973303\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In his latest book, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries, David Walsh offers a collection of essays that flesh out his personalist vision.1 Separated into three parts, “The Political Discovery,” “The Philosophical Discovery,” and “The Historical Discovery,” the book celebrates what Walsh views as the greatest modern insight, the priority of the person, from a variety of angles. The result is a thoughtful and original series of mediations on the theme, and a welcome invitation to share in Walsh’s wonder at the phenomenon of personhood. Though wide-ranging in topic, the central message of these essays is that persons are always beyond what can be written about them on the page. In his introductory chapter, Walsh argues that the priority of the person is a distinctly modern idea, discovered thanks to the turn toward the subject. Though he notes that the concept itself originated with the Greek prosōpon, and was taken up into Christianity for theological purposes, Walsh argues that it was not until the modern era that the move establishing the priority of the person was made. This was the break with the previously “instinctive subordination of the individual to the whole,” which he associates with liberalism, a political phenomenon founded on the conviction that the individual cannot be so subordinated (p. 3). Giving a historical overview of the political philosophers who paved the way for its emergence, Walsh shows how their endeavors were held back by their conception of human beings as individuals, a thin idea that failed to account for the relationality of personhood. Indeed, even today, Walsh argues, a philosophy of the person has yet to be fully worked out. Calling for such an eventuality, he spends the rest of the book fleshing out a history of why it has yet to be achieved. In section one, which follows the introductory chapter, Walsh zeroes in on the political discovery of the priority of the person. In arguing that the political discovery preceded the philosophical one, Walsh follows Hegel’s famous Owl of Minerva adage, suggesting that philosophy is always a reflection upon practices already in place. For Walsh, liberal democracy not only has a practical priority, but it also works better in practice than theory; indeed, he argues, liberal theorists still cannot account for the personhood they instinctively seek to protect. Ultimately, liberalism is noteworthy for its fundamental intuition, which is in accord with the true nature of the person. Indeed, for this reason, Walsh considers the emergence of liberalism in history to be almost fated, going so far as to suggest that democracy is prior to history. Because I found this claim especially puzzling, I will try to unpack its logic. Walsh, as I have said, argues that liberalism is a great achievement because it is rooted in a true conviction about the person. This, I think, is why he argues that “... so long as the democratic impulse lives within a single individual it has achieved its reality” (p. 72). Reflecting on liberalism, then, his interest seems less in the nitty-gritty of a given regime’s functionality and more on the emergence of a form of government which is consonant with the dignity of the person. For Walsh, it is very important that human beings are able to engage in self-governance because it allows them to take on the responsibility toward which personhood is intrinsically oriented. Viewed from this perspective, all other forms of government emerge as infantilizing. Strikingly, Walsh suggests that political life is erected upon the possibility of self-gift, the same possibility that makes personhood so special. By endowing citizens with the responsibility of self-rule, then, liberal regimes get at this fundamental meaning of political life in a new way. This is not to say that liberal regimes are models of self-donation, but they are uniquely conditioned by the possibility of self-donation. This, I think, is what Walsh means when he writes that “success is irrelevant, for it has already been\",\"PeriodicalId\":55874,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Perspectives on Political Science\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"229 - 232\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Perspectives on Political Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2021.1973303\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Perspectives on Political Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2021.1973303","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在他的新书《人的优先:政治、哲学和历史的发现》中,大卫·沃尔什提供了一系列文章,充实了他的个人主义观点这本书分为三个部分,“政治发现”、“哲学发现”和“历史发现”,从不同的角度颂扬沃尔什认为最伟大的现代洞察力,即人的优先地位。其结果是对这一主题进行了一系列深思熟虑的原创思考,并邀请我们分享沃尔什对人格现象的惊叹。虽然主题广泛,但这些文章的中心信息是,人们总是超越了纸上所能写的。在他的引言中,沃尔什认为,人的优先权是一个明显的现代观念,由于转向主题而被发现。尽管沃尔什指出,这个概念本身起源于希腊语prosōpon,并因神学目的被纳入基督教,但他认为,直到现代,确立个人优先地位的举动才出现。这打破了以前“个人本能地服从于整体”的观念,他将自由主义与自由主义联系在一起,自由主义是一种政治现象,建立在个人不能如此服从的信念之上(第3页)。沃尔什对为自由主义的出现铺平道路的政治哲学家进行了历史回顾,展示了他们的努力是如何被他们作为个体的人的概念所阻碍的,这是一个未能解释人格关系的单薄观念。沃尔什认为,事实上,即使在今天,人的哲学也尚未得到充分的研究。在呼吁实现这一目标的同时,他在书的其余部分详细阐述了为何这一目标尚未实现的历史。在引言之后的第一节中,沃尔什把注意力集中在政治上对人的优先地位的发现上。在论证政治发现先于哲学发现时,沃尔什遵循了黑格尔著名的密涅瓦猫头鹰(Owl of Minerva)格言,暗示哲学总是对已经存在的实践的反思。对沃尔什来说,自由民主不仅具有实际的优先权,而且在实践中比在理论中更有效;事实上,他认为,自由主义理论家仍然无法解释他们本能地寻求保护的人格。最终,自由主义值得注意的是它的基本直觉,它符合人的真实本性。的确,出于这个原因,沃尔什认为自由主义在历史上的出现几乎是命中注定的,甚至认为民主先于历史。因为我发现这种说法特别令人费解,所以我将尝试解开其逻辑。正如我所说,沃尔什认为自由主义是一项伟大的成就,因为它植根于对人的真正信念。我认为,这就是为什么他认为“……只要民主的冲动存在于一个人心中,它就实现了它的现实”(第72页)。因此,在反思自由主义时,他的兴趣似乎不在于某个特定政权功能的本质,而在于一种与人的尊严相一致的政府形式的出现。对沃尔什来说,人类能够进行自我管理是非常重要的,因为这让他们能够承担责任,而这是人格的内在导向。从这个角度来看,所有其他形式的政府都是幼稚化的。引人注目的是,沃尔什认为政治生活是建立在自我赠予的可能性之上的,同样的可能性使得人格如此特别。因此,通过赋予公民自治的责任,自由主义政权以一种新的方式实现了政治生活的基本意义。这并不是说自由主义政权是自我捐赠的典范,但它们是由自我捐赠的可能性所独有的。我想,这就是沃尔什所说的“成功无关紧要,因为它已经无关紧要了”的意思
David Walsh, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries
In his latest book, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries, David Walsh offers a collection of essays that flesh out his personalist vision.1 Separated into three parts, “The Political Discovery,” “The Philosophical Discovery,” and “The Historical Discovery,” the book celebrates what Walsh views as the greatest modern insight, the priority of the person, from a variety of angles. The result is a thoughtful and original series of mediations on the theme, and a welcome invitation to share in Walsh’s wonder at the phenomenon of personhood. Though wide-ranging in topic, the central message of these essays is that persons are always beyond what can be written about them on the page. In his introductory chapter, Walsh argues that the priority of the person is a distinctly modern idea, discovered thanks to the turn toward the subject. Though he notes that the concept itself originated with the Greek prosōpon, and was taken up into Christianity for theological purposes, Walsh argues that it was not until the modern era that the move establishing the priority of the person was made. This was the break with the previously “instinctive subordination of the individual to the whole,” which he associates with liberalism, a political phenomenon founded on the conviction that the individual cannot be so subordinated (p. 3). Giving a historical overview of the political philosophers who paved the way for its emergence, Walsh shows how their endeavors were held back by their conception of human beings as individuals, a thin idea that failed to account for the relationality of personhood. Indeed, even today, Walsh argues, a philosophy of the person has yet to be fully worked out. Calling for such an eventuality, he spends the rest of the book fleshing out a history of why it has yet to be achieved. In section one, which follows the introductory chapter, Walsh zeroes in on the political discovery of the priority of the person. In arguing that the political discovery preceded the philosophical one, Walsh follows Hegel’s famous Owl of Minerva adage, suggesting that philosophy is always a reflection upon practices already in place. For Walsh, liberal democracy not only has a practical priority, but it also works better in practice than theory; indeed, he argues, liberal theorists still cannot account for the personhood they instinctively seek to protect. Ultimately, liberalism is noteworthy for its fundamental intuition, which is in accord with the true nature of the person. Indeed, for this reason, Walsh considers the emergence of liberalism in history to be almost fated, going so far as to suggest that democracy is prior to history. Because I found this claim especially puzzling, I will try to unpack its logic. Walsh, as I have said, argues that liberalism is a great achievement because it is rooted in a true conviction about the person. This, I think, is why he argues that “... so long as the democratic impulse lives within a single individual it has achieved its reality” (p. 72). Reflecting on liberalism, then, his interest seems less in the nitty-gritty of a given regime’s functionality and more on the emergence of a form of government which is consonant with the dignity of the person. For Walsh, it is very important that human beings are able to engage in self-governance because it allows them to take on the responsibility toward which personhood is intrinsically oriented. Viewed from this perspective, all other forms of government emerge as infantilizing. Strikingly, Walsh suggests that political life is erected upon the possibility of self-gift, the same possibility that makes personhood so special. By endowing citizens with the responsibility of self-rule, then, liberal regimes get at this fundamental meaning of political life in a new way. This is not to say that liberal regimes are models of self-donation, but they are uniquely conditioned by the possibility of self-donation. This, I think, is what Walsh means when he writes that “success is irrelevant, for it has already been
期刊介绍:
Whether discussing Montaigne"s case for tolerance or Nietzsche"s political critique of modern science, Perspectives on Political Science links contemporary politics and culture to the enduring questions posed by great thinkers from antiquity to the present. Ideas are the lifeblood of the journal, which comprises articles, symposia, and book reviews. Recent articles address the writings of Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Plutarch; the movies No Country for Old Men and 3:10 to Yuma; and the role of humility in modern political thought.