具有选择性调查的专家小组

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-06-21 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2021-0010

Q. Gong, Huanxing Yang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要在多个专家的信息披露模型中，我们比较了同质面板和多样化面板。我们模型的显著特点是选择性调查：有多个方面与决策相关，每个专家都可以战略性地选择一些方面进行调查。我们发现，同质的小组会导致不平衡的调查和不平衡的行动，而在不同的小组下，调查和行动都是平衡的。在大多数情况下，不同面板的性能要好于同质面板。

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Expert Panels with Selective Investigation

Abstract In a model of information disclosure with multiple experts we compare homogeneous panels and diverse panels. The distinguishing feature of our model is selective investigation: there are multiple aspects relevant to decision making and each expert can strategically choose some aspects to investigate. We show that homogeneous panels lead to unbalanced investigation and unbalanced action, while under diverse panels both investigations and actions are balanced. In most circumstances, diverse panels perform better than homogeneous panels.

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.