投票制度和财政政策:来自决选和多数选举的证据

IF 1.8 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

National Tax Journal Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.1086/714181

Davide Cipullo

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文通过利用基于人口阈值的意大利市政当局对不同投票制度的分配，比较了决选投票制度和多数决规则下的政策结果。作为地方政权首脑的市长，在人口不足1.5万人的自治市实行多数选举，在人口超过1.5万人的自治市实行决选选举。回归不连续估计表明，采用决选制度的市政当局比采用多数决选制度的市政当局多支出12%，而且额外的支出不是通过提高税收来提供资金的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Voting Systems and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Runoff and Plurality Elections

This paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.

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来源期刊

National Tax Journal Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

11.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The goal of the National Tax Journal (NTJ) is to encourage and disseminate high quality original research on governmental tax and expenditure policies. Articles published in the regular March, June and September issues of the journal, as well as articles accepted for publication in special issues of the journal, are subject to professional peer review and include economic, theoretical, and empirical analyses of tax and expenditure issues with an emphasis on policy implications. The NTJ has been published quarterly since 1948 under the auspices of the National Tax Association (NTA). Most issues include an NTJ Forum, which consists of invited papers by leading scholars that examine in depth a single current tax or expenditure policy issue. The December issue is devoted to publishing papers presented at the NTA’s annual Spring Symposium; the articles in the December issue generally are not subject to peer review.