{"title":"四大审计事务所级别行业专业化的意外后果","authors":"Sharad Asthana, Rachana Kalelkar, K. Raman","doi":"10.1504/IJAAPE.2018.10012073","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Big 4 audit firms currently dominate the US audit market. We investigate whether the extent of a Big 4 local office's dependence on industry specialist clients impacts audit effort/earnings quality for the office's specialist as well as non-specialist clients. Our findings suggest that greater dependence on specialist clients is associated with higher audit effort/earnings quality for specialist clients but also with lower audit effort/earnings quality for the office's non-specialist clients. Our results hold when we propensity-match specialist and non-specialist clients to control for client characteristics as a possible confounding explanation. Our study is important, because it: 1) contributes to prior research that is largely silent on whether cross-sectional variations in reputation for industry-expertise are associated with variations in audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014); 2) suggests that, it would be appropriate for PCAOB inspectors to focus on non-specialist clients at audit offices with greater dependence on specialist clients as an area representing higher risk of lower audit effort/quality.","PeriodicalId":35413,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unintended consequences of Big 4 auditor office-level industry specialisation\",\"authors\":\"Sharad Asthana, Rachana Kalelkar, K. Raman\",\"doi\":\"10.1504/IJAAPE.2018.10012073\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Big 4 audit firms currently dominate the US audit market. We investigate whether the extent of a Big 4 local office's dependence on industry specialist clients impacts audit effort/earnings quality for the office's specialist as well as non-specialist clients. Our findings suggest that greater dependence on specialist clients is associated with higher audit effort/earnings quality for specialist clients but also with lower audit effort/earnings quality for the office's non-specialist clients. Our results hold when we propensity-match specialist and non-specialist clients to control for client characteristics as a possible confounding explanation. Our study is important, because it: 1) contributes to prior research that is largely silent on whether cross-sectional variations in reputation for industry-expertise are associated with variations in audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014); 2) suggests that, it would be appropriate for PCAOB inspectors to focus on non-specialist clients at audit offices with greater dependence on specialist clients as an area representing higher risk of lower audit effort/quality.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35413,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-04-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2018.10012073\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAAPE.2018.10012073","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
Unintended consequences of Big 4 auditor office-level industry specialisation
The Big 4 audit firms currently dominate the US audit market. We investigate whether the extent of a Big 4 local office's dependence on industry specialist clients impacts audit effort/earnings quality for the office's specialist as well as non-specialist clients. Our findings suggest that greater dependence on specialist clients is associated with higher audit effort/earnings quality for specialist clients but also with lower audit effort/earnings quality for the office's non-specialist clients. Our results hold when we propensity-match specialist and non-specialist clients to control for client characteristics as a possible confounding explanation. Our study is important, because it: 1) contributes to prior research that is largely silent on whether cross-sectional variations in reputation for industry-expertise are associated with variations in audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014); 2) suggests that, it would be appropriate for PCAOB inspectors to focus on non-specialist clients at audit offices with greater dependence on specialist clients as an area representing higher risk of lower audit effort/quality.
期刊介绍:
IJAAPE publishes original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of: financial accounting, managerial accounting, accounting education, auditing, taxation, public sector accounting, capital market and accounting, accounting information systems, performance evaluation, corporate governance, ethics, and financial management. All methodologies, such as analytical, empirical, behavioural, surveys, and case studies are welcome. IJAAPE encourages contributions especially from emerging markets and economies in transition and studies whose results are applicable across nation states or capable of being adapted to the different accounting and business environments.