{"title":"看不见的产前人类。","authors":"Jackson Milton","doi":"10.1080/15265161.2022.2089276","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"distributing the risks in such a way, the assumption is that pregnancies do not just happen; intercourse is chosen in most cases. So, the “risk” in being wrong on the pro-life side is making temperate sexual choices. So, the comparative moral risks are between killing innocents if wrong about Roe and making different sexual choices if wrong about overturning Roe (and States pass restrictive laws). These risks are clearly not symmetrical.","PeriodicalId":145777,"journal":{"name":"The American journal of bioethics : AJOB","volume":" ","pages":"82-84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Invisible Prenatal Human Being.\",\"authors\":\"Jackson Milton\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/15265161.2022.2089276\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"distributing the risks in such a way, the assumption is that pregnancies do not just happen; intercourse is chosen in most cases. So, the “risk” in being wrong on the pro-life side is making temperate sexual choices. So, the comparative moral risks are between killing innocents if wrong about Roe and making different sexual choices if wrong about overturning Roe (and States pass restrictive laws). These risks are clearly not symmetrical.\",\"PeriodicalId\":145777,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The American journal of bioethics : AJOB\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"82-84\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The American journal of bioethics : AJOB\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2022.2089276\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The American journal of bioethics : AJOB","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2022.2089276","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
distributing the risks in such a way, the assumption is that pregnancies do not just happen; intercourse is chosen in most cases. So, the “risk” in being wrong on the pro-life side is making temperate sexual choices. So, the comparative moral risks are between killing innocents if wrong about Roe and making different sexual choices if wrong about overturning Roe (and States pass restrictive laws). These risks are clearly not symmetrical.