医疗融资当局之间的竞争对市场收益和发行人利息支出的影响。

Q4 Medicine
Journal of Health Care Finance Pub Date : 2011-01-01
Patrick M Bernet, Caryl E Carpenter, Warren Saunders
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引用次数: 0

摘要

非营利性医疗机构的主要资金来源是免税的市政债券。这种债务的免税性质要求它们通过由州或地方政府机构管理或附属于政府机构的融资机构发行。在一些州,所有免税医疗债券必须通过单一的融资机构发行,但在其他州,发行医疗机构可以选择多个机构。利用发行人集中度的赫芬达尔指数,先前的研究发现,当局之间更大的竞争导致发行医疗保健机构的利息成本降低。我们继续之前研究的内容,研究当局竞争、发行人的利息支出和市场投资者的收益之间的联系。虽然我们对1994年至2002年间发行的所有医院债券的分析证实了早期关于发行医疗机构利息支出的发现,但我们也发现,发行人集中度较低的州范围内的当局的市场收益率较低。因此,从发行者的角度来看,权力竞争是好的,但在投资者的眼中却没有好处。另一方面,与州级政府相关的较低市场收益率并不会以较低的利息成本的形式传递给发行人。为了帮助理清这一矛盾,我们通过采访国家发行机构的高管来探索我们的发现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The impact of competition among health care financing authorities on market yields and issuer interest expenses.

The main source of capital for non-for-profit health care organizations is tax-exempt municipal bonds. The tax-exempt nature of this debt requires that they be issued through financing authorities, which are run by, or affiliated with, state or local government agencies. In some states, all tax-exempt health care bonds must be issued through a single financing authority, but in other states the issuing health care organization has a choice of multiple authorities. Using a Herfindahl index of issuer concentration, prior research has found that greater competition among authorities results in lower interest costs to the issuing health care organization. We pick up where this earlier study left off, examining the links between authority competition, the interest expenses to the issuer, and the yield to the market investor. Although our analysis of all hospital bonds issued between 1994 and 2002 corroborates earlier findings with regard to interest expenses to the issuing health care organization, we also find market yield is lower for statewide authorities where issuer concentration is lower. Thus, authority competition is good from the issuers' point of view, but holds no favor in the investors' eyes. On the other hand, the lower market yield associated with statewide authorities does not make its way down to the issuer in the form of lower interest costs. To help sort through this paradox, we explore our findings through interviews of executives in state issuing authorities.

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来源期刊
Journal of Health Care Finance
Journal of Health Care Finance Medicine-Health Policy
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Health Care Finance is the only quarterly journal devoted solely to helping you meet your facility"s financial goals. Each issue targets a key area of health care finance. Stay alert to new trends, opportunities, and threats. Make easier, better decisions, with advice from industry experts. Learn from the experiences of other health care organizations. Experts in the field share their experiences on successful programs, proven strategies, practical management tools, and innovative alternatives. The Journal covers today"s most complex dollars-and-cents issues, including hospital/physician contracts, alternative delivery systems, generating maximum margins under PPS.
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