内源性病毒突变、进化选择和遏制政策设计。

IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Patrick Mellacher
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引用次数: 0

摘要

新型冠状病毒将如何进化?我研究了一个简单的流行病学模型,在这个模型中,突变可能随机改变病毒及其相关疾病的特性,抗原漂移允许新变种部分逃避免疫。我通过分析表明,传染性更强、病程更长、潜伏期更短的变种更适合流行。针对无症状个体的 "聪明 "遏制政策可能会改变病毒的进化方向,因为这些政策会给潜伏期较长、无症状感染比例较高的变种带来优势。另一方面,降低死亡率本身并不能证明是一种进化优势。然后,我将该模型作为一个基于代理的模拟模型来实施,以探索其总体动态。蒙特卡洛模拟显示:a)遏制政策的设计对病毒进化的速度和方向都有影响;b)如果遏制工作过于松懈,病毒逃避免疫的倾向足够高,病毒可能会在人群中无限循环;关键的是,c)仅从短期流行病学结果来看,可能无法区分进化缓慢的病毒和进化迅速的病毒。因此,在短期内看似成功的缓解策略,可能会产生破坏性的长期影响。这些结果表明,最佳遏制政策必须考虑到病毒变异和逃避免疫的倾向,从而加强了甚至在流行病早期阶段进行基因和抗原监测的理由。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Endogenous viral mutations, evolutionary selection, and containment policy design.

Endogenous viral mutations, evolutionary selection, and containment policy design.

Endogenous viral mutations, evolutionary selection, and containment policy design.

Endogenous viral mutations, evolutionary selection, and containment policy design.

How will the novel coronavirus evolve? I study a simple epidemiological model, in which mutations may change the properties of the virus and its associated disease stochastically and antigenic drifts allow new variants to partially evade immunity. I show analytically that variants with higher infectiousness, longer disease duration, and shorter latent period prove to be fitter. "Smart" containment policies targeting symptomatic individuals may redirect the evolution of the virus, as they give an edge to variants with a longer incubation period and a higher share of asymptomatic infections. Reduced mortality, on the other hand, does not per se prove to be an evolutionary advantage. I then implement this model as an agent-based simulation model in order to explore its aggregate dynamics. Monte Carlo simulations show that a) containment policy design has an impact on both speed and direction of viral evolution, b) the virus may circulate in the population indefinitely, provided that containment efforts are too relaxed and the propensity of the virus to escape immunity is high enough, and crucially c) that it may not be possible to distinguish between a slowly and a rapidly evolving virus by looking only at short-term epidemiological outcomes. Thus, what looks like a successful mitigation strategy in the short run, may prove to have devastating long-run effects. These results suggest that optimal containment policy must take the propensity of the virus to mutate and escape immunity into account, strengthening the case for genetic and antigenic surveillance even in the early stages of an epidemic.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
18.20%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination addresses the vibrant and interdisciplinary field of agent-based approaches to economics and social sciences. It focuses on simulating and synthesizing emergent phenomena and collective behavior in order to understand economic and social systems. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, the following: markets as complex adaptive systems, multi-agents in economics, artificial markets with heterogeneous agents, financial markets with heterogeneous agents, theory and simulation of agent-based models, adaptive agents with artificial intelligence, interacting particle systems in economics, social and complex networks, econophysics, non-linear economic dynamics, evolutionary games, market mechanisms in distributed computing systems, experimental economics, collective decisions. Contributions are mostly from economics, physics, computer science and related fields and are typically based on sound theoretical models and supported by experimental validation. Survey papers are also welcome. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination is the official journal of the Association of Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents. Officially cited as: J Econ Interact Coord
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