Christopher Robertson, Daniel Scheitrum, Aleks Schaefer, Trey Malone, Brandon R McFadden, Kent D Messer, Paul J Ferraro
{"title":"付钱让美国人接种疫苗——是有益还是适得其反?","authors":"Christopher Robertson, Daniel Scheitrum, Aleks Schaefer, Trey Malone, Brandon R McFadden, Kent D Messer, Paul J Ferraro","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab027","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against coronavirus disease of 2019. We performed a randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of 1000 American adults in December 2020. Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive conditions ($1000, $1500, or $2000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find that-without coupled financial incentives-only 58 per cent of survey respondents would elect for vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives may be counter-productive.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab027"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/e6/dc/lsab027.PMC8420956.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Paying Americans to take the vaccine-would it help or backfire?\",\"authors\":\"Christopher Robertson, Daniel Scheitrum, Aleks Schaefer, Trey Malone, Brandon R McFadden, Kent D Messer, Paul J Ferraro\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jlb/lsab027\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against coronavirus disease of 2019. We performed a randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of 1000 American adults in December 2020. Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive conditions ($1000, $1500, or $2000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find that-without coupled financial incentives-only 58 per cent of survey respondents would elect for vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives may be counter-productive.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":56266,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Law and the Biosciences\",\"volume\":\"8 2\",\"pages\":\"lsab027\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/e6/dc/lsab027.PMC8420956.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Law and the Biosciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab027\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2021/7/1 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"eCollection\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab027","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2021/7/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"eCollection","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Paying Americans to take the vaccine-would it help or backfire?
This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against coronavirus disease of 2019. We performed a randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of 1000 American adults in December 2020. Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive conditions ($1000, $1500, or $2000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find that-without coupled financial incentives-only 58 per cent of survey respondents would elect for vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives may be counter-productive.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Law and the Biosciences (JLB) is the first fully Open Access peer-reviewed legal journal focused on the advances at the intersection of law and the biosciences. A co-venture between Duke University, Harvard University Law School, and Stanford University, and published by Oxford University Press, this open access, online, and interdisciplinary academic journal publishes cutting-edge scholarship in this important new field. The Journal contains original and response articles, essays, and commentaries on a wide range of topics, including bioethics, neuroethics, genetics, reproductive technologies, stem cells, enhancement, patent law, and food and drug regulation. JLB is published as one volume with three issues per year with new articles posted online on an ongoing basis.