{"title":"不要在家里尝试:FDA对家庭测试设备的限制性规定。","authors":"Shelby Baird","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has successfully restricted consumers' access to home-testing applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently, it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers\nwould make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant results. Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the \"safety and effectiveness\" of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the term \"safety\" to encompass considerations of how consumers might use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note\nargues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad interpretation of safety\" in restricting home-testing devices. It documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, \"super deference\" because of the complicated nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA's interpretation of \"safety\" because it did not use its scientific expertise\nwhen it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the authority to make decisions based on its view of \"safety\" because it should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their personal medical information.</p>","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"67 2","pages":"383-426"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Don’t Try This at Home: the FDA’s Restrictive Regulation of Home Testing Devices.\",\"authors\":\"Shelby Baird\",\"doi\":\"\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has successfully restricted consumers' access to home-testing applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently, it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers\\nwould make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant results. Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the \\\"safety and effectiveness\\\" of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the term \\\"safety\\\" to encompass considerations of how consumers might use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note\\nargues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad interpretation of safety\\\" in restricting home-testing devices. It documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, \\\"super deference\\\" because of the complicated nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA's interpretation of \\\"safety\\\" because it did not use its scientific expertise\\nwhen it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the authority to make decisions based on its view of \\\"safety\\\" because it should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their personal medical information.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"67 2\",\"pages\":\"383-426\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Don’t Try This at Home: the FDA’s Restrictive Regulation of Home Testing Devices.
Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has successfully restricted consumers' access to home-testing applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently, it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers
would make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant results. Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the "safety and effectiveness" of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the term "safety" to encompass considerations of how consumers might use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note
argues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad interpretation of safety" in restricting home-testing devices. It documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, "super deference" because of the complicated nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA's interpretation of "safety" because it did not use its scientific expertise
when it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the authority to make decisions based on its view of "safety" because it should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their personal medical information.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.