不要在家里尝试:FDA对家庭测试设备的限制性规定。

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Duke Law Journal Pub Date : 2017-11-01
Shelby Baird
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的四十年里,美国食品和药物管理局(FDA)已经成功地限制了消费者使用家庭测试应用程序,其理念是它应该保护个人免受自己对测试结果的反应。在20世纪70年代,FDA曾短暂地拒绝女性使用与实验室使用的相同的家用验孕棒。在20世纪80年代末和90年代初,由于担心消费者对艾滋病毒检测结果的反应,它明确禁止使用艾滋病毒家庭检测技术。最近,由于担心消费者在收到基因变异结果后会做出不合理的医疗决定,它对23andMe等直接面向消费者(DTC)的基因检测公司施加了繁重的限制。尽管FDA有法定权力确保医疗器械的“安全性和有效性”,但它对“安全性”一词的解释过于宽泛,包括考虑消费者如何使用纯信息设备提供的检测结果。本报告认为,法院不应在限制家庭检测设备时服从FDA对“安全”的广义解释。它记录了基于专业知识的司法尊重的基本原理的演变,指出法院通常会向包括FDA在内的科学机构提供“超级尊重”,因为它们的工作性质复杂。最终,法院不应该听从FDA对“安全”的解释,因为它在考虑消费者对HIV家庭检测和DTC基因检测结果的反应时没有使用其科学专业知识。此外,FDA不应该有权力根据其对“安全”的看法做出决定,因为它不应该有权力就消费者是否应该寻求他们的个人医疗信息做出价值判断。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Don’t Try This at Home: the FDA’s Restrictive Regulation of Home Testing Devices.

Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has successfully restricted consumers' access to home-testing applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently, it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers would make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant results. Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the "safety and effectiveness" of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the term "safety" to encompass considerations of how consumers might use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note argues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad interpretation of safety" in restricting home-testing devices. It documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, "super deference" because of the complicated nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA's interpretation of "safety" because it did not use its scientific expertise when it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the authority to make decisions based on its view of "safety" because it should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their personal medical information.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
0.00%
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期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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