反对肾脏捐赠激励临床试验的道德困境论证。

Transplantation research Pub Date : 2015-07-22 eCollection Date: 2015-01-01 DOI:10.1186/s13737-015-0025-9
G V Ramesh Prasad
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引用次数: 2

摘要

商业移植旅游对肾脏捐赠者和接受者都造成了巨大的伤害。然而,鼓励肾脏捐赠的支持者声称,对这一过程进行适当的监督可以防止这些危害,而且移植数量可以安全地增加,从而减轻终末期肾脏疾病后果的道德负担。在道德困境分析中,防止捐赠者伤害的原则可以与为接受者和社会提供利益的原则分离开来。受激励的捐赠者与未受补偿的捐赠者有着根本的不同,这似乎是合理的。受到激励的捐赠者可能会遭受与缺乏监管无关的伤害,因为他们的特征是由叠加在贫困环境上的激励决定的。此外,建立一个激励捐赠的系统,而没有建立全国性的登记制度来记录所有长期捐赠的结果,在道德上是不一致的,因为没有事先证明捐赠的结果不依赖于收入或财富,在道德上不能在临床试验中创造出激励捐赠的人群。社会经济因素对其他手术人群的预后有不利影响,对这些人群的收入或财富的干预措施尚未研究。在没有肾脏疾病的家庭中,强制措施将增加,在这些家庭中,激励措施是了解新的收入来源,而不是潜在的接受者。在肾脏捐赠等选择性手术中,如果发生冲突,“捐赠者的无恶意”优先于“捐赠者的自主”、“接受者的受益”、“对社会的受益”。然而,我们仍然面临着终末期肾脏疾病的总道德负担,这属于无法提供足够捐赠肾脏的社会。根据两难境地的一方面采取行动以防止捐助者受到伤害并不会消除对另一方面的义务,即向受援国提供利益。为了解决道德负担,作为道德主体,我们必须通过增加其他来源的捐赠器官来重新安排我们的机构。捐献肾脏的短缺给社会造成了道德负担,但捐献的激励只会增加终末期肾病的总道德负担。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation.

Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance. Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease, where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.

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