Engaging the States of the former soviet union in health security.

While it would be comforting to assure that the job would be finished when our cooperative programs—the Department of Defense’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, begun for biology in 1994, or the Department of State’s Biological Engagement Program, launched in 2006— complete their assignments and depart any country, the answer to the verification question will always be beyond our grasp, particularly in regions where we lack open and transparent relationships. The BWC is necessary but not sufficient for our national and global biosecurity. Verifying that any individual nation state is in compliance is not possible. The BWC is an important international norm and law; as a nation, it is critical that we demonstrate globally and consistently our full support of it and work with other signatories to enforce the norm and law it represents. The Department of State takes the lead on BWC issues, but to enhance security from external biological attack requires an integrated international effort by the whole-ofgovernment, academe, industry, and nongovernmental organizations. A robust network of multinational partnerships is also needed. Finally, the US government must understand the power of human relationships in this complex biological world. As a relevant 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report stated, we should ‘‘recognize that personal relationships and professional networks that are developed through USG Cooperative Threat Reduction programs contribute directly to our national security.’’ The Global Health Security Agenda concept newly introduced by the White House appears to be compatible with that principle.