弱理论的隐藏优势。

Anthropology and Philosophy Pub Date : 2011-01-01
Frank Keil
{"title":"弱理论的隐藏优势。","authors":"Frank Keil","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There has been a strong tradition of assuming that concepts, and their patterns of formation might be best understood in terms of how they are embedded in theory-like sets of beliefs. Although such views of concepts as embedded in theories have been criticized on five distinct grounds, there are reasonable responses to each of these usual objections. There is, however, a newly emerging concern that is much more challenging to address - people's intuitive theories seem to be remarkably impoverished. In fact, they are so impoverished it is difficult to see how they could provide the necessary structure to explain differences between concepts and how they might form in development. One response to this recent challenge is to abandon all views of concept structure as being related to people's intuitive theories and see concepts as essentially structure-free atoms. The alternative proposed here argues that our very weak theories might in fact do a great deal of work in explaining how we form concepts and are able to use them to successfully refer.</p>","PeriodicalId":90438,"journal":{"name":"Anthropology and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4190847/pdf/nihms366717.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Hidden Strengths of Weak Theories.\",\"authors\":\"Frank Keil\",\"doi\":\"\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>There has been a strong tradition of assuming that concepts, and their patterns of formation might be best understood in terms of how they are embedded in theory-like sets of beliefs. Although such views of concepts as embedded in theories have been criticized on five distinct grounds, there are reasonable responses to each of these usual objections. There is, however, a newly emerging concern that is much more challenging to address - people's intuitive theories seem to be remarkably impoverished. In fact, they are so impoverished it is difficult to see how they could provide the necessary structure to explain differences between concepts and how they might form in development. One response to this recent challenge is to abandon all views of concept structure as being related to people's intuitive theories and see concepts as essentially structure-free atoms. The alternative proposed here argues that our very weak theories might in fact do a great deal of work in explaining how we form concepts and are able to use them to successfully refer.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":90438,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Anthropology and Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4190847/pdf/nihms366717.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Anthropology and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Anthropology and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

有一种强大的传统,即认为概念及其形成模式最好从它们如何嵌入类似理论的信念集的角度来理解。尽管这种将概念嵌入理论的观点受到了五种不同理由的批评,但对每一种通常的反对意见都有合理的回应。然而,一个新出现的问题却更具挑战性--人们的直觉理论似乎非常贫乏。事实上,人们的直觉理论是如此贫乏,以至于很难想象它们如何能提供必要的结构来解释概念之间的差异,以及概念在发展过程中是如何形成的。对这一最新挑战的一种回应是,放弃所有关于概念结构与人们的直觉理论相关的观点,将概念视为本质上无结构的原子。本文提出的另一种观点则认为,我们非常薄弱的理论在解释我们如何形成概念以及如何利用概念成功地进行指称方面实际上可能做了大量的工作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Hidden Strengths of Weak Theories.

There has been a strong tradition of assuming that concepts, and their patterns of formation might be best understood in terms of how they are embedded in theory-like sets of beliefs. Although such views of concepts as embedded in theories have been criticized on five distinct grounds, there are reasonable responses to each of these usual objections. There is, however, a newly emerging concern that is much more challenging to address - people's intuitive theories seem to be remarkably impoverished. In fact, they are so impoverished it is difficult to see how they could provide the necessary structure to explain differences between concepts and how they might form in development. One response to this recent challenge is to abandon all views of concept structure as being related to people's intuitive theories and see concepts as essentially structure-free atoms. The alternative proposed here argues that our very weak theories might in fact do a great deal of work in explaining how we form concepts and are able to use them to successfully refer.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信