健康保险合同的竞争性投标:来自HMO在线拍卖的经验教训。

Alok Gupta, Stephen T Parente, Pallab Sanyal
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引用次数: 17

摘要

医疗保健是现代社会的重要社会和经济组成部分,在该行业中有效利用信息技术对其成功至关重要。随着医疗保险费的持续上涨,竞争性招标可能有助于产生更强的价格竞争,并降低雇主和政府机构的保费成本。在本文中,我们评估了几家财富500强公司通过让hmo在公开的电子拍卖中竞争来降低员工医疗保健采购成本的努力。虽然拍卖在第一年(即1999年)成功地为公司节省了大量成本,但它们未能复制成功,并最终在两年后停止。在拍卖试验失败后的过去十年里,信息技术的有效利用使复杂电子市场的设计取得了重大进展。利用这些知识和来自拍卖的数据,我们指出了拍卖设计的几个缺点,我们认为这些缺点导致了三年后市场的中断。根据我们的分析,我们提出了一些可操作的建议,决策者可以使用这些建议来设计一个可持续的医疗保险电子采购市场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance.

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