{"title":"牙科服务的激励及薪酬制度。","authors":"Jostein Grytten, Dorthe Holst, Irene Skau","doi":"10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The aim of this study was to examine the effects of an incentive-based remuneration system on number of individuals under supervision and on quality of public dental services in Norway. The basis for the study was a natural experiment in which all public dental officers in one county were given the opportunity to renegotiate their contract from a fixed salary contract to a combined per capita and fixed salary contract. Comprehensive data were collected before and after the change. A main finding is that the transition to an incentive-based remuneration system led to an increase in the number of individuals under supervision without either a fall in quality or a patient selection effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":73453,"journal":{"name":"International journal of health care finance and economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2","citationCount":"48","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Incentives and remuneration systems in dental services.\",\"authors\":\"Jostein Grytten, Dorthe Holst, Irene Skau\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>The aim of this study was to examine the effects of an incentive-based remuneration system on number of individuals under supervision and on quality of public dental services in Norway. The basis for the study was a natural experiment in which all public dental officers in one county were given the opportunity to renegotiate their contract from a fixed salary contract to a combined per capita and fixed salary contract. Comprehensive data were collected before and after the change. A main finding is that the transition to an incentive-based remuneration system led to an increase in the number of individuals under supervision without either a fall in quality or a patient selection effect.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":73453,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International journal of health care finance and economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2\",\"citationCount\":\"48\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International journal of health care finance and economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2008/12/28 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International journal of health care finance and economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9050-2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2008/12/28 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Incentives and remuneration systems in dental services.
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of an incentive-based remuneration system on number of individuals under supervision and on quality of public dental services in Norway. The basis for the study was a natural experiment in which all public dental officers in one county were given the opportunity to renegotiate their contract from a fixed salary contract to a combined per capita and fixed salary contract. Comprehensive data were collected before and after the change. A main finding is that the transition to an incentive-based remuneration system led to an increase in the number of individuals under supervision without either a fall in quality or a patient selection effect.