卫生保健系统的预算编制。

Effective health care Pub Date : 1984-01-01
A Maynard
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去十年中,人们已经认识到,所有公共和私营卫生保健系统都存在不正当动机(特别是道德风险和第三方支付),导致稀缺经济资源的使用效率低下。低效率是不道德的:医生低效地利用资源,剥夺了潜在病人可能从中受益的护理。为了根除不道德和效率低下的做法,必须遵循两条经济规则:(i)如果服务的总成本超过其总收益,就不应提供服务;(ii)如果总效益超过总成本,则提供的水平应达到额外投入成本(边际成本)等于额外效益(边际效益)的水平。这种效率测试可以应用于卫生保健系统、其组成部分以及控制其中资源分配的个人(尤其是医生)。不幸的是,所有的卫生保健系统既没有产生相关的决策数据,也没有足够的灵活性来使用这些数据来影响卫生保健决策。预算制度有两种基本类型:资源导向型和生产导向型。前者让人痴迷于现金限额,却很少考虑其他资源配置模式的好处,尤其是在边缘地区。后者使人们过分注意护理过程的生产,而很少注意成本,特别是边际成本。因此,一套预算规则可能导致不计收益的成本控制,而另一套预算规则可能导致不计成本的产出最大化。为了结束这种低效率的循环,有必要发展市场化结构。为此,提倡客户群体(广泛定义为所有现有的公共和私人活动)预算系统,并确定有能力转移资源并寻求成本效益政策的预算持有人。在西欧和美国的卫生保健系统的实验中,正在纳入有明确预算和鼓励决策者节约使用资源的谈判产出目标。必须避免对这些实验的成功过度乐观,因为这些问题在西方和苏联集团已经存在了几十年,而有效的解决方案显然是缺乏的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Budgeting in health care systems.

During the last decade there has been a recognition that all health care systems, public and private, are characterised by perverse incentives (especially moral hazard and third party pays) which generate inefficiency in the use of scarce economic resources. Inefficiency is unethical: doctors who use resources inefficiently deprive potential patients of care from which they could benefit. To eradicate unethical and inefficient practices two economic rules have to be followed: (i) no service should be provided if its total costs exceed its total benefits; (ii) if total benefits exceed total costs, the level of provision should be at that level at which the additional input cost (marginal cost) is equal to the additional benefits (marginal benefit). This efficiency test can be applied to health care systems, their component parts and the individuals (especially doctors) who control resource allocation within them. Unfortunately, all health care systems neither generate this relevant decision making data nor are they flexible enough to use it to affect health care decisions. There are two basic varieties of budgeting system: resource based and production targeted. The former generates obsession with cash limits and too little regard of the benefits, particularly at the margins, of alternative patterns of resource allocation. The latter generates undue attention to the production of processes of care and scant regard for costs, especially at the margins. Consequently, one set of budget rules may lead to cost containment regardless of benefits and the other set of budget rules may lead to output maximization regardless of costs. To close this circle of inefficiency it is necessary to evolve market-like structures. To do this a system of client group (defined broadly across all existing activities public and private) budgets is advocated with an identification of the budget holder who has the capacity to shift resources and seek out cost effective policies. Negotiated output targets with defined budgets and incentives for decision makers to economise in their use of resources are being incorporated into experiments in the health care systems of Western Europe and the United States. Undue optimism about the success of these experiments must be avoided because these problems have existed in the West and in the Soviet bloc for decades and efficient solutions are noticeable by their absence.

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