丹尼尔·卡尼曼对我思想的影响

IF 3.5 4区 计算机科学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Ai Magazine Pub Date : 2026-10-26 DOI:10.1002/aaai.70108
Gary Marcus
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By the time I decided to go to Hampshire College a few months later, I already knew that I wanted to study cognitive science, drinking as deeply as I could from fields like philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science.</p><p>In a summer project at Hampshire, supervised by Neil Stillings, I studied reasoning from a cross-cultural perspective; though most of Danny's work was on Western subjects, a large fraction of what I read was influenced by Danny. A 1982 book that he co-edited with Amos Tversky and Paul Slovic, <i>Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases</i> was practically my bible (Tversky &amp; Kahneman, <span>1974</span>). My undergraduate thesis (known at Hampshire as a “Division III”) was an experimental study about one facet of rationality: how people formed and revised their beliefs relative to evidence — very much a Danny kind of question. (In a nutshell I found that people quickly lost track of how they formed their beliefs, and would sometimes develop rationalizations for those beliefs, retaining those rationalized beliefs even if the original evidence for them was discredited.)</p><p>In graduate school, I left reasoning behind and went to work with Steven Pinker, on an entirely different topic: language acquisition. But the things I found there in some ways paralleled the “System I” (fast, reflexive, automatic) and “System II” (deliberative reasoning) distinction that Danny later made famous in <i>Thinking, Fast and Slow</i> (Kahneman, <span>2011</span>). 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I argued that that network lacked an adequate distinction between individuals and kinds, and showed how it overgeneralized information about individuals to other people that shared properties. Instead, I argued that people used something like Danny's notion (in work with Anne Treisman) of object files. You could think of these as being something like index cards, holding knowledge about specific entities. My argument then was that until we developed alternative neural networks with something similar, the kind of overgeneralization errors that I observed (that we now know as hallucinations) would likely be inevitable. A quarter century later, I still see it that way; modern models are better in many ways, but still lack proper object files.</p><p>My 2008 book <i>Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind</i> (which Danny read and enjoyed, before we became friends, sending me an unsolicited email that made my day!) was about human irrationality, and how it evolved (Marcus, <span>2009</span>). It was the first time that I wrote explicitly about the System I/System II distinction (which I called reflexive vs deliberative), and Danny's influence can be seen throughout the book; in essence I was trying to explain <i>why</i> the human mind was littered with the kinds of biases that Danny, and others influenced by him, had documented for decades. 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Danny influenced cognitive psychology, economics, anthropology, politics, AI and so many other fields; he traversed them all fluently, and of course won a Nobel in Economics even though much of his academic career was spent in psychology departments. (There is no Nobel for psychology, but he surely would have won one had there been.) 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My undergraduate thesis (known at Hampshire as a “Division III”) was an experimental study about one facet of rationality: how people formed and revised their beliefs relative to evidence — very much a Danny kind of question. (In a nutshell I found that people quickly lost track of how they formed their beliefs, and would sometimes develop rationalizations for those beliefs, retaining those rationalized beliefs even if the original evidence for them was discredited.)</p><p>In graduate school, I left reasoning behind and went to work with Steven Pinker, on an entirely different topic: language acquisition. But the things I found there in some ways paralleled the “System I” (fast, reflexive, automatic) and “System II” (deliberative reasoning) distinction that Danny later made famous in <i>Thinking, Fast and Slow</i> (Kahneman, <span>2011</span>). 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I argued that that network lacked an adequate distinction between individuals and kinds, and showed how it overgeneralized information about individuals to other people that shared properties. Instead, I argued that people used something like Danny's notion (in work with Anne Treisman) of object files. You could think of these as being something like index cards, holding knowledge about specific entities. My argument then was that until we developed alternative neural networks with something similar, the kind of overgeneralization errors that I observed (that we now know as hallucinations) would likely be inevitable. A quarter century later, I still see it that way; modern models are better in many ways, but still lack proper object files.</p><p>My 2008 book <i>Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind</i> (which Danny read and enjoyed, before we became friends, sending me an unsolicited email that made my day!) was about human irrationality, and how it evolved (Marcus, <span>2009</span>). It was the first time that I wrote explicitly about the System I/System II distinction (which I called reflexive vs deliberative), and Danny's influence can be seen throughout the book; in essence I was trying to explain <i>why</i> the human mind was littered with the kinds of biases that Danny, and others influenced by him, had documented for decades. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

毫不夸张地说,丹尼·卡尼曼在我成年甚至更早的时候就影响了我的思想;我第一次了解他的研究是在我15岁那年的一个认知心理学暑期班上。仅仅几年之后,我就完全沉浸其中了。当我在他晚年认识他的时候,我感到非常兴奋。我们经常在格林威治村的珍珠牡蛎酒吧(Pearl Oyster Bar)吃午饭,我们俩总是点他们美味的龙虾卷。餐厅没了,我想念那些龙虾卷,但我更想念丹尼。我最后一次见到丹尼是在他去世前几个月,在一次晚宴上,他换了姓名牌,这样我们就能坐在一起了。我会永远珍惜那段记忆。让他参加我在疫情期间共同主持的20人左右的“人工智能辩论”,也是一件令人兴奋的事情;他不情愿地参加了会议,说他不确定自己有什么可以贡献的,他的思路清晰,是当晚的亮点。我们的大部分谈话都是关于人工智能的,我对它很感兴趣,他对它也很好奇。但它们是建立在对认知心理学的共同兴趣之上的。其实是通过认知心理学,而不是人工智能,我才第一次意识到他的工作,以及他的工作是如何开始影响我的。在那个暑期课上,我听说过他关于人类非理性的研究。几个月后,当我决定去汉普郡学院时,我已经知道我想学习认知科学,尽可能深入地学习哲学、心理学、语言学和计算机科学等领域的知识。在汉普郡的一个暑期项目中,由尼尔·斯蒂尔斯(Neil Stillings)指导,我从跨文化的角度学习推理;虽然丹尼的大部分作品都是关于西方主题的,但我读到的大部分作品都受到了丹尼的影响。1982年,他与阿莫斯·特沃斯基(Amos Tversky)和保罗·斯洛维奇(Paul Slovic)合编的一本书《不确定性下的判断:启发式和偏见》(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)实际上是我的圣经。我的本科论文(在汉普郡被称为“第三部分”)是一项关于理性的一个方面的实验研究:人们如何根据证据形成和修正他们的信念——这是一个非常丹尼式的问题。(简而言之,我发现人们很快就会忘记他们是如何形成自己的信念的,有时会为这些信念找到合理化的理由,即使最初的证据不可信,也会保留这些合理化的信念。)读研究生的时候,我放弃了推理,和史蒂文·平克(Steven Pinker)一起研究一个完全不同的课题:语言习得。但我在那里发现的东西在某种程度上与“系统I”(快速、反射、自动)和“系统II”(审慎推理)的区别相似,丹尼后来在《思考,快与慢》(卡尼曼,2011)中出名。我作为研究生的第一个主要项目,成为我论文的核心,表明儿童在获取英语过去时时使用两种不同的机制,一种是对不规则动词(例如,sing-sang, go- go)的统计性质的联想记忆系统,以及对规则动词(talk-talk, walk-walk等)的规则遵循系统。这显然与丹尼描述的相似。在我的整个职业生涯中,丹尼的工作在很多方面影响了我。另一个不太关注人类理性的交叉点出现在我2001年出版的《代数思维》(The Algebraic Mind, Marcus, 2003)一书中。在这本书中,我从认知科学的角度阐述了神经符号人工智能的论点,并首次对幻觉提出了警告,当然,幻觉至今仍困扰着大型语言模型。我用一个当时很流行的神经网络模型做了一个实验,展示了幻觉是如何产生的,这个模型是今天模型的前身。我认为这个网络在个体和种类之间缺乏充分的区分,并展示了它是如何将关于个体的信息过度概括为具有共同属性的其他人的。相反,我认为人们使用了类似Danny(与Anne Treisman合作)的目标文件概念。你可以把它们想象成索引卡,上面有关于特定实体的知识。我当时的观点是,除非我们开发出具有类似功能的替代神经网络,否则我所观察到的那种过度泛化错误(我们现在称之为幻觉)可能是不可避免的。四分之一个世纪过去了,我仍然这么看;现代模型在许多方面都更好,但仍然缺乏适当的目标文件。我2008年出版的书《Kluge:人类思维的偶然进化》(在我们成为朋友之前,丹尼读了这本书,并很喜欢,他给我发了一封不请自来的电子邮件,这让我很开心!)是关于人类的非理性及其进化的(马库斯,2009)。 这是我第一次明确地写系统I/系统II的区别(我称之为反射性vs审议性),丹尼的影响可以在整本书中看到;从本质上讲,我是在试图解释为什么人类的思维中充斥着各种各样的偏见,丹尼和其他受他影响的人已经记录了几十年了。(简而言之,这本书的论点是,人类思维的进化不是作为一个完美的解决方案,而是作为一个聚合在先前的系统之上,更适合其他目的,比如跟踪总体统计趋势。)我在2023年的TED演讲中使用了Danny著名的系统I和系统II的区别来构建对神经符号AI的需求(Marcus, 2023)。我将神经网络比作他的系统I,将经典AI比作系统II,并表示AI显然需要这两者。(最近的系统,如Claude Code和OpenAI的codex,实际上两者都使用;很长一段时间以来,该领域一直试图使用其中一种。)问题是,我相信成千上万的其他科学家可以讲述类似的故事,关于丹尼的工作对他们的影响有多深。丹尼影响了认知心理学、经济学、人类学、政治学、人工智能等诸多领域;他流畅地完成了这些任务,当然,他还获得了诺贝尔经济学奖,尽管他的大部分学术生涯都是在心理学系度过的。(目前没有诺贝尔心理学奖,但如果有的话,他肯定会获奖。)《经济学人》将他列为全球第七大最有影响力的经济学家,这是他影响力的真实证明,当时丹尼甚至还没有接受经济学家的培训。我最后一次见到丹尼是在2023年11月;他89岁,热情、好奇、完全清醒,是我所见过的头脑最敏锐的人之一。我非常想念他。作者与Daniel Kahneman和Hans Zimmer, 2023年11月,纽约作者声明无利益冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Daniel Kahneman's Influence on My Thought

It would not be an exaggeration to say that Danny Kahneman has influenced my thinking throughout my adult life and even earlier; I first learned about one strand of his work at a summer class on cognitive psychology when I was fifteen. Just a few years later, I became completely immersed in it. When I got to know him personally, in his later years, it was a huge thrill. We would often have lunch at the Pearl Oyster Bar in Greenwich Village, both of us invariably ordering their amazing lobster rolls. The restaurant is gone and I miss those lobster rolls, but I miss Danny much more.

The last time that I saw Danny was just a couple of months before he died, at a dinner, and he had switched name tags so that we could sit together. I will always cherish that memory. It was also a real thrill to have him participate in the 20-or so person “AI debate” that I co-hosted during the pandemic; he participated reluctantly, saying he wasn't sure he had anything to contribute, and characteristically was lucid and a highlight of the night.

Most of our conversations were about AI, which I had gravitated towards and which he was deeply curious about. But they were built on and grounded in a shared interest in cognitive psychology.

And it is really through cognitive psychology rather than AI that I first became aware of his work, and how his work first began to influence me. I had heard brief mention of his work on human irrationality in that summer class. By the time I decided to go to Hampshire College a few months later, I already knew that I wanted to study cognitive science, drinking as deeply as I could from fields like philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and computer science.

In a summer project at Hampshire, supervised by Neil Stillings, I studied reasoning from a cross-cultural perspective; though most of Danny's work was on Western subjects, a large fraction of what I read was influenced by Danny. A 1982 book that he co-edited with Amos Tversky and Paul Slovic, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases was practically my bible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). My undergraduate thesis (known at Hampshire as a “Division III”) was an experimental study about one facet of rationality: how people formed and revised their beliefs relative to evidence — very much a Danny kind of question. (In a nutshell I found that people quickly lost track of how they formed their beliefs, and would sometimes develop rationalizations for those beliefs, retaining those rationalized beliefs even if the original evidence for them was discredited.)

In graduate school, I left reasoning behind and went to work with Steven Pinker, on an entirely different topic: language acquisition. But the things I found there in some ways paralleled the “System I” (fast, reflexive, automatic) and “System II” (deliberative reasoning) distinction that Danny later made famous in Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman, 2011). My first major project as a graduate student, which became the core of my dissertation, showed that children used two distinct mechanisms in acquiring the past tense of English, an associative memory system that was statistical in nature for irregular verbs (e.g., sing-sang, go-went), and a rule-following system for regular verbs (talk-talked, walk-walked, etc.). There were clearly parallels with what Danny described.

Danny's work influenced mine in many ways, throughout my career. Another point of intersection, less focused on human (ir)rationality, came in my 2001 book The Algebraic Mind (Marcus, 2003), where I laid out the arguments for neurosymbolic AI, from a cognitive science perspective—and first warned about hallucinations, which of course haunt large language models to this day. I showed how hallucinations emerged in an experiment with a neural network model that was popular then, a predecessor to today's models. I argued that that network lacked an adequate distinction between individuals and kinds, and showed how it overgeneralized information about individuals to other people that shared properties. Instead, I argued that people used something like Danny's notion (in work with Anne Treisman) of object files. You could think of these as being something like index cards, holding knowledge about specific entities. My argument then was that until we developed alternative neural networks with something similar, the kind of overgeneralization errors that I observed (that we now know as hallucinations) would likely be inevitable. A quarter century later, I still see it that way; modern models are better in many ways, but still lack proper object files.

My 2008 book Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind (which Danny read and enjoyed, before we became friends, sending me an unsolicited email that made my day!) was about human irrationality, and how it evolved (Marcus, 2009). It was the first time that I wrote explicitly about the System I/System II distinction (which I called reflexive vs deliberative), and Danny's influence can be seen throughout the book; in essence I was trying to explain why the human mind was littered with the kinds of biases that Danny, and others influenced by him, had documented for decades. (In a nutshell, the argument of the book was that the human mind evolved not as a perfect solution but as an aggregation on top of prior systems that were better suited to other purposes, such as tracking overall statistical trends.)

My 2023 TED Talk used Danny's famous System I and System II distinction to frame the need for neurosymbolic AI (Marcus, 2023). I likened neural networks to his System I, classical AI to System II, and said that it was obvious that AI would need both. (Recent systems like Claude Code and OpenAI's codex do in fact use both; for a long time, the field tried to get by with one or the other.)

The thing is, I am sure thousands of other scientists could tell similar stories, about how deeply Danny's work influenced them. Danny influenced cognitive psychology, economics, anthropology, politics, AI and so many other fields; he traversed them all fluently, and of course won a Nobel in Economics even though much of his academic career was spent in psychology departments. (There is no Nobel for psychology, but he surely would have won one had there been.) It is a true testament to his reach that The Economist listed him as the seventh most influential economist in the world when Danny wasn't even trained as an economist.

The last time I saw Danny was in November 2023; he was 89, passionate, curious, and completely lucid, one of the sharpest minds I have ever met.

I miss him dearly.

The author with Daniel Kahneman and Hans Zimmer, November 2023, New York City

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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来源期刊
Ai Magazine
Ai Magazine 工程技术-计算机:人工智能
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
61
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: AI Magazine publishes original articles that are reasonably self-contained and aimed at a broad spectrum of the AI community. Technical content should be kept to a minimum. In general, the magazine does not publish articles that have been published elsewhere in whole or in part. The magazine welcomes the contribution of articles on the theory and practice of AI as well as general survey articles, tutorial articles on timely topics, conference or symposia or workshop reports, and timely columns on topics of interest to AI scientists.
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