通过议价确定价格和质量的合并

IF 1.5 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2026-10-09 Epub Date: 2026-07-21 DOI:10.1111/ecin.70076

David J. Balan, Jeremy A. Sandford

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了双边议价环境下横向并购对产品质量的影响。在我们的模型中，只要买方质量对价格的边际替代率随价格下降而保持质量不变，降低竞争的合并就会降低均衡质量。这种情况与质量是否为正常商品密切相关。当价格和质量共同协商时，这一结果成立，并扩展到卖方首先选择质量，然后与买方讨价还价的顺序设置。我们将讨论采购和医疗保健市场的应用程序，以及一些扩展。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Mergers when price and quality are set by bargaining

We study the effects of horizontal mergers on product quality in a bilateral bargaining environment. In our model, a competition-reducing merger reduces equilibrium quality as long as the buyer's marginal rate of substitution of quality for price declines with price, holding quality constant. This condition is closely related to quality being a normal good. This result holds when price and quality are jointly negotiated, and it extends to a sequential setting in which sellers first choose quality and then bargain with buyers over price. We discuss applications to procurement and healthcare markets, as well as several extensions.

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来源期刊

Economic Inquiry ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.