Customary Institutions and Cattle Raiding Violence: The Dina and the Dahalo of Southern Madagascar

Abstract To what extent can customary institutions explain regional variation in organized cattle raiding violence? Existing research highlights the importance of customary institutions in sustaining local peace and resolving communal conflict, but far less is known about whether—and how—they can mitigate organized criminal violence. This article addresses that gap using data from Madagascar, where violence carried out by criminal groups known as dahalo has intensified over the past decade. Drawing on evidence from two regions in southern Madagascar, it examines how variation in organized cattle raiding violence relates to differences in three governance functions of customary institutions known as dina: rule creation, enforcement, and adjudication. The analysis argues that these governance functions shape local opportunity structures for organized violence by influencing institutional legitimacy, utilization, and community participation. The findings suggest that locally created rules and adjudication practices perceived as proportionate foster broader institutional utilization, while coordinated preventive enforcement facilitates community participation, thereby reducing opportunities for organized cattle raiding violence. In contrast, externally imposed rules, punitive enforcement, and disproportionate adjudication weaken institutional utilization and create more favourable conditions for organized cattle raiding violence. The findings extend existing research by showing how customary institutions can mitigate organized criminal violence.