代理理论与高阶风险变化

IF 4.5 3区管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Annals of Operations Research Pub Date : 2026-04-07 DOI:10.1007/s10479-026-07081-5

Claudio A. Bonilla, Hervé Roche, Marcos Vergara

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了当风险前景的合适排序由高阶而非一阶风险变化更好地表示时的经典代理模型。我们得出了委托人希望代理人提供比次优共享规则下更大的努力水平的偏好条件。我们的描述试图弥合风险和不确定性经济理论的当前发展与经典代理模型之间的差距。最后，我们将研究结果应用于CARA、CRRA和HARA偏好。

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Agency theory and higher-order risk changes

We study the classic agency model when the suitable ordering of risky prospects is better represented by higher- rather than first-order risk changes. We derive conditions on preferences under which the principal would want a greater effort level provided by the agent than the one provided under the second-best sharing rule. Our characterization attempts to bridge the gap between current developments in the economic theory of risk and uncertainty and the classical agency model. Finally, we apply our findings to CARA, CRRA and HARA preferences.

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来源期刊

Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

16.70%

发文量

596

审稿时长

8.4 months

期刊介绍： The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.