Shasha Yu;Yanan Qiao;Fan Yang;Wenjia Zhao;Junge Bo
{"title":"基于动态进化博弈的区块链系统押注池选择建模及去中心化增强","authors":"Shasha Yu;Yanan Qiao;Fan Yang;Wenjia Zhao;Junge Bo","doi":"10.1109/JAS.2025.125447","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The proof-of-stake (PoS) mechanism is a consensus protocol within blockchain technology that determines the validation of transactions and the minting of new blocks based on the participant's stake in the cryptocurrency network. In contrast to proof-of-work (PoW), which relies on computational power to validate transactions, PoS employs a deterministic and resource-efficient approach to elect validators. Whereas, an inherent risk of PoS is the potential for centralization among a small cohort of network participants possessing substantial stakes, jeopardizing system decentralization and posing security threats. To mitigate centralization issues within PoS, this study introduces an incentive-aligned mechanism named decentralized proof-of-stake (DePoS), wherein the second-largest stakeholder is chosen as the final validator with a higher probability. Integrated with the verifiable random function (VRF), DePoS rewards the largest stake-holder with uncertainty, thus disincentivizing stakeholders from accumulating the largest stake. Additionally, a dynamic evolutionary game model is innovatively developed to simulate the evolution of staking pools, thus facilitating the investigation of staking pool selection dynamics and equilibrium stability across PoS and DePoS systems. The findings demonstrate that DePoS generally fosters wealth decentralization by discouraging the accumulation of significant cryptocurrency holdings. Through theoretical analysis of stakeholder predilection in staking pool selection and the simulation of the evolutionary tendency in pool scale, this research demonstrates the comparative advantage in decentralization offered by DePoS over the conventional PoS.","PeriodicalId":54230,"journal":{"name":"Ieee-Caa Journal of Automatica Sinica","volume":"12 9","pages":"1850-1865"},"PeriodicalIF":19.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dynamic Evolutionary Game-Based Staking Pool Selection Modeling and Decentralization Enhancement for Blockchain System\",\"authors\":\"Shasha Yu;Yanan Qiao;Fan Yang;Wenjia Zhao;Junge Bo\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/JAS.2025.125447\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The proof-of-stake (PoS) mechanism is a consensus protocol within blockchain technology that determines the validation of transactions and the minting of new blocks based on the participant's stake in the cryptocurrency network. In contrast to proof-of-work (PoW), which relies on computational power to validate transactions, PoS employs a deterministic and resource-efficient approach to elect validators. Whereas, an inherent risk of PoS is the potential for centralization among a small cohort of network participants possessing substantial stakes, jeopardizing system decentralization and posing security threats. To mitigate centralization issues within PoS, this study introduces an incentive-aligned mechanism named decentralized proof-of-stake (DePoS), wherein the second-largest stakeholder is chosen as the final validator with a higher probability. Integrated with the verifiable random function (VRF), DePoS rewards the largest stake-holder with uncertainty, thus disincentivizing stakeholders from accumulating the largest stake. Additionally, a dynamic evolutionary game model is innovatively developed to simulate the evolution of staking pools, thus facilitating the investigation of staking pool selection dynamics and equilibrium stability across PoS and DePoS systems. The findings demonstrate that DePoS generally fosters wealth decentralization by discouraging the accumulation of significant cryptocurrency holdings. Through theoretical analysis of stakeholder predilection in staking pool selection and the simulation of the evolutionary tendency in pool scale, this research demonstrates the comparative advantage in decentralization offered by DePoS over the conventional PoS.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54230,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ieee-Caa Journal of Automatica Sinica\",\"volume\":\"12 9\",\"pages\":\"1850-1865\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":19.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-10-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ieee-Caa Journal of Automatica Sinica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11208747/\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ieee-Caa Journal of Automatica Sinica","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11208747/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Dynamic Evolutionary Game-Based Staking Pool Selection Modeling and Decentralization Enhancement for Blockchain System
The proof-of-stake (PoS) mechanism is a consensus protocol within blockchain technology that determines the validation of transactions and the minting of new blocks based on the participant's stake in the cryptocurrency network. In contrast to proof-of-work (PoW), which relies on computational power to validate transactions, PoS employs a deterministic and resource-efficient approach to elect validators. Whereas, an inherent risk of PoS is the potential for centralization among a small cohort of network participants possessing substantial stakes, jeopardizing system decentralization and posing security threats. To mitigate centralization issues within PoS, this study introduces an incentive-aligned mechanism named decentralized proof-of-stake (DePoS), wherein the second-largest stakeholder is chosen as the final validator with a higher probability. Integrated with the verifiable random function (VRF), DePoS rewards the largest stake-holder with uncertainty, thus disincentivizing stakeholders from accumulating the largest stake. Additionally, a dynamic evolutionary game model is innovatively developed to simulate the evolution of staking pools, thus facilitating the investigation of staking pool selection dynamics and equilibrium stability across PoS and DePoS systems. The findings demonstrate that DePoS generally fosters wealth decentralization by discouraging the accumulation of significant cryptocurrency holdings. Through theoretical analysis of stakeholder predilection in staking pool selection and the simulation of the evolutionary tendency in pool scale, this research demonstrates the comparative advantage in decentralization offered by DePoS over the conventional PoS.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality papers in English on original theoretical/experimental research and development in the field of automation. The journal covers a wide range of topics including automatic control, artificial intelligence and intelligent control, systems theory and engineering, pattern recognition and intelligent systems, automation engineering and applications, information processing and information systems, network-based automation, robotics, sensing and measurement, and navigation, guidance, and control.
Additionally, the journal is abstracted/indexed in several prominent databases including SCIE (Science Citation Index Expanded), EI (Engineering Index), Inspec, Scopus, SCImago, DBLP, CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure), CSCD (Chinese Science Citation Database), and IEEE Xplore.