公共EVSE系统中物理网络安全的定量框架

IF 5.4 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Ahmet Kilic
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引用次数: 0

摘要

公共电动汽车供电设备(EVSE)由于其在关键基础设施中的开放、无人值守和硬件可访问的部署,越来越容易受到物理网络攻击。尽管连通性不断增长,但缺乏结构化和定量的方法来评估针对电源、USB端口和RFID读取器等组件的物理操作所产生的风险。本研究引入了HO-PHYSICS(整体物理网络安全系统学),这是一个新的框架,旨在识别、建模和定量评估公共EVSE环境中的物理网络威胁。该框架由三个集成组件组成:(1)混合威胁结构(HTS),用于对具有物理和逻辑节点的攻击树建模;(2)攻击潜力评估(APE),用于多准则风险评分;(3)基于MATLAB/Simulink动态仿真的仿真系统压力测试(S3T)。为了验证该框架,研究了三种典型的攻击场景:PSU操纵、RFID欺骗和基于usb的破坏。相应的APE得分在23到30之间(满分50分),表明高可行性和低可检测性。基于时间的模拟确认了关键的系统风险,并能够结构化地推导缓解策略。开发的框架弥合了规范性安全标准和操作风险分析之间的方法差距。它为研究人员、基础设施运营商和监管机构提供了一种可转移的工具,以评估和改善EVSE系统的物理网络安全。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A quantitative framework for physical cybersecurity in public EVSE systems
Public Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) is increasingly exposed to physical cyberattacks due to its open, unattended, and hardware-accessible deployment in critical infrastructure. Despite growing connectivity, there is a lack of structured and quantitative methodologies to assess the risks arising from physical manipulations targeting components such as power supplies, USB ports, and RFID readers.
This study introduces HO-PHYSICS (Holistic Physical Cybersecurity Systematics), a novel framework designed to identify, model, and quantitatively evaluate physical cyber threats in public EVSE environments. The framework consists of three integrated components: (1) Hybrid Threat Structuring (HTS) for modeling attack trees with physical and logical nodes, (2) Attack Potential Evaluation (APE) for multi-criteria risk scoring, and (3) Simulative System Stress Testing (S3T) based on dynamic MATLAB/Simulink simulations.
To validate the framework, three representative attack scenarios are examined: PSU manipulation, RFID spoofing, and USB-based sabotage. The corresponding APE scores range from 23 to 30 (out of 50), indicating high feasibility and low detectability. Time-based simulations confirm critical system risks and enable a structured derivation of mitigation strategies.
The developed framework bridges a methodological gap between normative security standards and operational risk analysis. It offers a transferable tool for researchers, infrastructure operators, and regulators to assess and improve physical cybersecurity in EVSE systems.
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来源期刊
Computers & Security
Computers & Security 工程技术-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
7.10%
发文量
365
审稿时长
10.7 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Security is the most respected technical journal in the IT security field. With its high-profile editorial board and informative regular features and columns, the journal is essential reading for IT security professionals around the world. Computers & Security provides you with a unique blend of leading edge research and sound practical management advice. It is aimed at the professional involved with computer security, audit, control and data integrity in all sectors - industry, commerce and academia. Recognized worldwide as THE primary source of reference for applied research and technical expertise it is your first step to fully secure systems.
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