{"title":"中国反腐运动的效果:来自住房交易的证据","authors":"Yongqiang Chu, Weida Kuang, Daxuan Zhao","doi":"10.1111/ecin.70002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using price discounts government officials receive when buying new housing units as a measure of corruption in China, we examine the effect of the anti-corruption campaign launched by the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. We find that the discounts decrease sharply after the campaign. On the other hand, we find no effect of the campaign on existing housing sales. Furthermore, officials become less likely to purchase housing units with lucky numbers. Overall, the results suggest that the anti-corruption campaign is effective in curbing corruption.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":"63 4","pages":"1232-1251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The effect of the anti-corruption campaign in China: Evidence from housing transactions\",\"authors\":\"Yongqiang Chu, Weida Kuang, Daxuan Zhao\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecin.70002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Using price discounts government officials receive when buying new housing units as a measure of corruption in China, we examine the effect of the anti-corruption campaign launched by the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. We find that the discounts decrease sharply after the campaign. On the other hand, we find no effect of the campaign on existing housing sales. Furthermore, officials become less likely to purchase housing units with lucky numbers. Overall, the results suggest that the anti-corruption campaign is effective in curbing corruption.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51380,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Inquiry\",\"volume\":\"63 4\",\"pages\":\"1232-1251\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Inquiry\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.70002\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.70002","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The effect of the anti-corruption campaign in China: Evidence from housing transactions
Using price discounts government officials receive when buying new housing units as a measure of corruption in China, we examine the effect of the anti-corruption campaign launched by the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. We find that the discounts decrease sharply after the campaign. On the other hand, we find no effect of the campaign on existing housing sales. Furthermore, officials become less likely to purchase housing units with lucky numbers. Overall, the results suggest that the anti-corruption campaign is effective in curbing corruption.
期刊介绍:
Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.