考虑品牌溢出效应的品牌导入与信息共享决策之间的相互作用

IF 4.5 3区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Hui Cao, Jinjiang Yan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一个博弈论模型,用于研究在合作竞争的供应链中,零售商选择是否引入商店品牌并与品牌制造商共享需求信息。在主模型中,我们认为零售商的店铺品牌引进决策先于信息共享决策。我们充分探讨了涉及零售商战略决策特征的四种场景:无门店品牌引入无信息共享(NN)、无门店品牌引入无信息共享(NS)、门店品牌引入无信息共享(IN)、门店品牌引入无信息共享(IS)。我们的分析得出了以下有趣的结论:首先,我们的研究表明,在一定条件下,NB制造商将受益于SB的引入。其次,我们论证了零售商的店铺品牌导入与信息共享是相互促进的。最后,本文还探讨了企业企业外溢程度和固定引进成本对均衡战略结果的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Interactions between store brand introduction and information sharing decisions considering store brand spillover

Interactions between store brand introduction and information sharing decisions considering store brand spillover

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to investigate store brand (SB) introduction and information sharing decisions within a co-opetitive supply chain between a national brand (NB) manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer chooses whether to introduce a store brand and share demand information with the NB manufacturer. In the main model, we consider that the retailer’s store brand introduction decision precedes the information sharing decision. We fully explore four scenarios involving the retailer’s strategic decision characteristics: no store brand introduction and no information sharing (NN), no store brand introduction and information sharing (NS), store brand introduction and no information sharing (IN), and store brand introduction and information sharing (IS). Our analysis draws the following interesting conclusions: Firstly, our research reveals that the NB manufacturer will benefit from SB introduction under certain conditions. Secondly, we demonstrate that the retailer’s store brand introduction and information sharing reinforce each other. Finally, our study also makes a contribution to how the degree of SB spillover and the fixed introduction cost affect the equilibrium strategy outcome.

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来源期刊
Annals of Operations Research
Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
16.70%
发文量
596
审稿时长
8.4 months
期刊介绍: The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.
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