协调者或共谋者：机构投资者网络与超额商誉

IF 6.9 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-09-19 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2025.108511

Ziang Chen, Junrui Zhang, Tingting Liu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

机构投资者通常被视为通过制衡控股股东和管理者来加强治理的外部监督者。然而，来自中国共同所有权网络的证据表明，它们可能容忍不利于长期发展的做法，尤其是商誉溢价。利用2008年至2022年中国a股公司的数据，我们发现拥有集中机构投资者的公司报告了更高的超额商誉。在非国有企业、纵向并购和混合并购、高管过于自信的企业和机构投资者集中度超过行业平均水平的企业中，这种效应更强。机构投资者更频繁的实地考察减少了多余的商誉，但并没有消除它。这些发现在多个敏感性检查和内生性测试中仍然是稳健的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Coordinator or colluder: Institutional investor network and excess goodwill

Institutional investors are often regarded as external monitors that strengthen governance by counterbalancing controlling shareholders and managers. However, evidence from China’s common ownership networks shows that they may tolerate practices harmful to long-term development, particularly goodwill premiums. Using data on Chinese A-share firms from 2008 to 2022, we find that companies with centrally positioned institutional investors report higher excess goodwill. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises, vertical and mixed mergers and acquisitions, firms with overconfident executives, and firms with institutional investor concentration exceeding the industry average. More frequent site visits by institutional investors reduce excess goodwill, but they do not eliminate it. These findings remain robust across multiple sensitivity checks and endogeneity tests.

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来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance