{"title":"资金约束下生态工业园区废水循环利用利益相关者行为策略演化","authors":"Kaixuan Zhang , Xu Han","doi":"10.1016/j.compchemeng.2025.109402","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks (EIPs) represents an effective approach to achieving water sustainability. However, financial constraints among multiple stakeholders hinder the development of wastewater recycling systems. To address this challenge, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving upstream manufacturers, downstream manufacturers, and banks under government environmental regulations. The model examines wastewater management strategies while accounting for constrained access to green financing. The analysis reveals that multiple factors significantly influence stakeholders’ participation behaviors and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Specifically, higher wastewater transaction prices strengthen downstream manufacturers’ engagement in industrial symbiosis. Higher green loan interest rates motivate banks to extend credit to upstream manufacturers. Although increased subsidies promote downstream manufacturers’ participation, they may simultaneously diminish upstream manufacturers’ demand for green loans. Notably, higher emission allowances reduce the incentive for upstream manufacturers to borrow green loans, while higher transaction prices have the opposite effect. Based on these findings, this paper offers policy suggestions aimed at improving financing mechanisms and fostering sustainable industrial symbiosis within EIPs. The results provide valuable insights into stakeholder behavior dynamics and support decision-making for both practitioners and policymakers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":286,"journal":{"name":"Computers & Chemical Engineering","volume":"204 ","pages":"Article 109402"},"PeriodicalIF":3.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Behavioral strategies evolution of stakeholders for wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks under financial constraints\",\"authors\":\"Kaixuan Zhang , Xu Han\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.compchemeng.2025.109402\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks (EIPs) represents an effective approach to achieving water sustainability. However, financial constraints among multiple stakeholders hinder the development of wastewater recycling systems. To address this challenge, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving upstream manufacturers, downstream manufacturers, and banks under government environmental regulations. The model examines wastewater management strategies while accounting for constrained access to green financing. The analysis reveals that multiple factors significantly influence stakeholders’ participation behaviors and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Specifically, higher wastewater transaction prices strengthen downstream manufacturers’ engagement in industrial symbiosis. Higher green loan interest rates motivate banks to extend credit to upstream manufacturers. Although increased subsidies promote downstream manufacturers’ participation, they may simultaneously diminish upstream manufacturers’ demand for green loans. Notably, higher emission allowances reduce the incentive for upstream manufacturers to borrow green loans, while higher transaction prices have the opposite effect. Based on these findings, this paper offers policy suggestions aimed at improving financing mechanisms and fostering sustainable industrial symbiosis within EIPs. The results provide valuable insights into stakeholder behavior dynamics and support decision-making for both practitioners and policymakers.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":286,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Computers & Chemical Engineering\",\"volume\":\"204 \",\"pages\":\"Article 109402\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-09-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Computers & Chemical Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0098135425004053\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Computers & Chemical Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0098135425004053","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Behavioral strategies evolution of stakeholders for wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks under financial constraints
Wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks (EIPs) represents an effective approach to achieving water sustainability. However, financial constraints among multiple stakeholders hinder the development of wastewater recycling systems. To address this challenge, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving upstream manufacturers, downstream manufacturers, and banks under government environmental regulations. The model examines wastewater management strategies while accounting for constrained access to green financing. The analysis reveals that multiple factors significantly influence stakeholders’ participation behaviors and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Specifically, higher wastewater transaction prices strengthen downstream manufacturers’ engagement in industrial symbiosis. Higher green loan interest rates motivate banks to extend credit to upstream manufacturers. Although increased subsidies promote downstream manufacturers’ participation, they may simultaneously diminish upstream manufacturers’ demand for green loans. Notably, higher emission allowances reduce the incentive for upstream manufacturers to borrow green loans, while higher transaction prices have the opposite effect. Based on these findings, this paper offers policy suggestions aimed at improving financing mechanisms and fostering sustainable industrial symbiosis within EIPs. The results provide valuable insights into stakeholder behavior dynamics and support decision-making for both practitioners and policymakers.
期刊介绍:
Computers & Chemical Engineering is primarily a journal of record for new developments in the application of computing and systems technology to chemical engineering problems.