资金约束下生态工业园区废水循环利用利益相关者行为策略演化

IF 3.9 2区 工程技术 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Kaixuan Zhang , Xu Han
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引用次数: 0

摘要

生态工业园区的废水回收利用是实现水可持续性的有效途径。然而,多个利益相关者之间的资金限制阻碍了废水回收系统的发展。为了解决这一挑战,本文建立了一个政府环境监管下涉及上游制造商、下游制造商和银行的三方进化博弈模型。该模型考察了废水管理战略,同时考虑了获得绿色融资的受限条件。分析表明,多种因素显著影响利益相关者的参与行为和进化稳定策略(ESS)。具体而言,较高的废水交易价格加强了下游制造商对产业共生的参与。较高的绿色贷款利率促使银行向上游制造商提供信贷。虽然补贴的增加促进了下游制造商的参与,但同时也可能减少上游制造商对绿色贷款的需求。值得注意的是,较高的排放限额降低了上游制造商借入绿色贷款的动机,而较高的交易价格则会产生相反的效果。在此基础上,本文提出了完善融资机制和促进工业园区内可持续产业共生的政策建议。研究结果为利益相关者行为动态提供了有价值的见解,并为从业者和决策者提供了决策支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavioral strategies evolution of stakeholders for wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks under financial constraints
Wastewater recycling in eco-industrial parks (EIPs) represents an effective approach to achieving water sustainability. However, financial constraints among multiple stakeholders hinder the development of wastewater recycling systems. To address this challenge, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving upstream manufacturers, downstream manufacturers, and banks under government environmental regulations. The model examines wastewater management strategies while accounting for constrained access to green financing. The analysis reveals that multiple factors significantly influence stakeholders’ participation behaviors and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Specifically, higher wastewater transaction prices strengthen downstream manufacturers’ engagement in industrial symbiosis. Higher green loan interest rates motivate banks to extend credit to upstream manufacturers. Although increased subsidies promote downstream manufacturers’ participation, they may simultaneously diminish upstream manufacturers’ demand for green loans. Notably, higher emission allowances reduce the incentive for upstream manufacturers to borrow green loans, while higher transaction prices have the opposite effect. Based on these findings, this paper offers policy suggestions aimed at improving financing mechanisms and fostering sustainable industrial symbiosis within EIPs. The results provide valuable insights into stakeholder behavior dynamics and support decision-making for both practitioners and policymakers.
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来源期刊
Computers & Chemical Engineering
Computers & Chemical Engineering 工程技术-工程:化工
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
14.00%
发文量
374
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: Computers & Chemical Engineering is primarily a journal of record for new developments in the application of computing and systems technology to chemical engineering problems.
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