Shanshan Li , Mengfan Ma , Yunxia Han , Chunxiang Xu
{"title":"针对重复数据删除云存储的防颠覆密码保护加密","authors":"Shanshan Li , Mengfan Ma , Yunxia Han , Chunxiang Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104233","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Message-Locked Encryption (MLE) enables encrypted deduplication by deriving keys directly from data. Servers-aided MLE extends this model with a master secret shared across key servers, and is widely used for secure deduplicated storage. However, existing servers-aided MLE schemes require users to locally store a separate MLE key for each data item, thereby imposing significant key management burdens. To address this, Zhang et al. introduced SPADE, a password-protected encryption scheme that enables users to manage MLE keys using only a human-memorable password. It applies two-layer encryption: data is encrypted with the MLE key, which is then encrypted with a symmetric key derived from a password-based seed and the user’s identity. The seed is generated via a distributed oblivious pseudorandom function using the data and a password-hardening key shared across key servers. SPADE also supports password-based authentication with both key servers and the cloud server, while preserving encrypted deduplication and servers-aided security. However, it faces three limitations: (i) high storage overhead from per-user credentials and password-hardening keys; (ii) high computational cost due to per-key server authentication; and (iii) vulnerability to subversion attacks if user devices are compromised.</div><div>In this paper, we propose SR-PPE, a subversion-resistant password-protected encryption scheme for deduplicated cloud storage. In SR-PPE, we present a signature-based authentication mechanism where public/secret key pairs are derived from a password-based seed, so servers can perform challenge–response authentication without storing per-user credentials. To enable secure key generation and resist password-guessing attacks, we design an enhanced distributed partially oblivious pseudorandom function that binds computation to users’ identities. We further propose a Merkle tree-based challenge–response mechanism for efficient authentication across multiple servers. A reverse firewall is deployed between users and externals to prevent subversion attacks by generating unbiased randomness and re-randomizing outgoing messages. Security analysis under multiple adversary models and evaluation of communication, computation, and storage costs show that SR-PPE provides strong security with practical efficiency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48638,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Information Security and Applications","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 104233"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Towards subversion-resistant password-protected encryption for deduplicated cloud storage\",\"authors\":\"Shanshan Li , Mengfan Ma , Yunxia Han , Chunxiang Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104233\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Message-Locked Encryption (MLE) enables encrypted deduplication by deriving keys directly from data. Servers-aided MLE extends this model with a master secret shared across key servers, and is widely used for secure deduplicated storage. However, existing servers-aided MLE schemes require users to locally store a separate MLE key for each data item, thereby imposing significant key management burdens. To address this, Zhang et al. introduced SPADE, a password-protected encryption scheme that enables users to manage MLE keys using only a human-memorable password. It applies two-layer encryption: data is encrypted with the MLE key, which is then encrypted with a symmetric key derived from a password-based seed and the user’s identity. The seed is generated via a distributed oblivious pseudorandom function using the data and a password-hardening key shared across key servers. SPADE also supports password-based authentication with both key servers and the cloud server, while preserving encrypted deduplication and servers-aided security. However, it faces three limitations: (i) high storage overhead from per-user credentials and password-hardening keys; (ii) high computational cost due to per-key server authentication; and (iii) vulnerability to subversion attacks if user devices are compromised.</div><div>In this paper, we propose SR-PPE, a subversion-resistant password-protected encryption scheme for deduplicated cloud storage. In SR-PPE, we present a signature-based authentication mechanism where public/secret key pairs are derived from a password-based seed, so servers can perform challenge–response authentication without storing per-user credentials. To enable secure key generation and resist password-guessing attacks, we design an enhanced distributed partially oblivious pseudorandom function that binds computation to users’ identities. We further propose a Merkle tree-based challenge–response mechanism for efficient authentication across multiple servers. A reverse firewall is deployed between users and externals to prevent subversion attacks by generating unbiased randomness and re-randomizing outgoing messages. Security analysis under multiple adversary models and evaluation of communication, computation, and storage costs show that SR-PPE provides strong security with practical efficiency.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48638,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Information Security and Applications\",\"volume\":\"94 \",\"pages\":\"Article 104233\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Information Security and Applications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212625002704\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Information Security and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212625002704","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Towards subversion-resistant password-protected encryption for deduplicated cloud storage
Message-Locked Encryption (MLE) enables encrypted deduplication by deriving keys directly from data. Servers-aided MLE extends this model with a master secret shared across key servers, and is widely used for secure deduplicated storage. However, existing servers-aided MLE schemes require users to locally store a separate MLE key for each data item, thereby imposing significant key management burdens. To address this, Zhang et al. introduced SPADE, a password-protected encryption scheme that enables users to manage MLE keys using only a human-memorable password. It applies two-layer encryption: data is encrypted with the MLE key, which is then encrypted with a symmetric key derived from a password-based seed and the user’s identity. The seed is generated via a distributed oblivious pseudorandom function using the data and a password-hardening key shared across key servers. SPADE also supports password-based authentication with both key servers and the cloud server, while preserving encrypted deduplication and servers-aided security. However, it faces three limitations: (i) high storage overhead from per-user credentials and password-hardening keys; (ii) high computational cost due to per-key server authentication; and (iii) vulnerability to subversion attacks if user devices are compromised.
In this paper, we propose SR-PPE, a subversion-resistant password-protected encryption scheme for deduplicated cloud storage. In SR-PPE, we present a signature-based authentication mechanism where public/secret key pairs are derived from a password-based seed, so servers can perform challenge–response authentication without storing per-user credentials. To enable secure key generation and resist password-guessing attacks, we design an enhanced distributed partially oblivious pseudorandom function that binds computation to users’ identities. We further propose a Merkle tree-based challenge–response mechanism for efficient authentication across multiple servers. A reverse firewall is deployed between users and externals to prevent subversion attacks by generating unbiased randomness and re-randomizing outgoing messages. Security analysis under multiple adversary models and evaluation of communication, computation, and storage costs show that SR-PPE provides strong security with practical efficiency.
期刊介绍:
Journal of Information Security and Applications (JISA) focuses on the original research and practice-driven applications with relevance to information security and applications. JISA provides a common linkage between a vibrant scientific and research community and industry professionals by offering a clear view on modern problems and challenges in information security, as well as identifying promising scientific and "best-practice" solutions. JISA issues offer a balance between original research work and innovative industrial approaches by internationally renowned information security experts and researchers.