基于联邦多智能体深度强化学习的充电站运营商竞争定价策略

Yezhen Wang;Qiuwei Wu;Zepeng Li;Shengyu Tao;Shiwei Xie;Xuan Zhang;Wai Kin Victor Chan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着交通电气化的快速推进,电动汽车的普及使电力网络和交通网络相互连接,形成了车-行-电的纽带。充电站运营商通过设定充电价格,可以有效引导电动汽车的充电行为,缓解电网压力,提高盈利能力。本文提出了一个Nash-Stackelberg-Nash (N-S-N)博弈模型来研究企业社会组织的竞争性收费定价策略。针对用户对出行成本的不完全理性和感知错误,利用弹性需求交通分配问题(SUE-ED-TAP)模型建立了随机用户均衡。此外,为了保护cso和EV用户的隐私,提出了一种基于联邦多智能体深度强化学习的解决方法。在该方法中,引入非营利性聚合器在智能体之间交换神经网络参数,在不共享cso数据的情况下实现隐私保护和协作学习。在两个测试系统上的实例研究表明,与现有算法相比,该方法获得了更高的收益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Federated Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning-Based Competitive Pricing Strategy for Charging Station Operators
With the rapid advancements in transportation electrification, the proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) has interconnected power and transportation networks, forming the vehicle-traffic-power nexus. By setting charging prices, charging station operators (CSOs) can effectively guide the charging behavior of EVs, alleviate grid stress, and enhance profitability. This paper proposes a Nash-Stackelberg-Nash (N-S-N) game model to investigate the competitive charging pricing strategy for CSOs. We establish the stochastic user equilibrium with the elastic demand traffic assignment problem (SUE-ED-TAP) model to account for users' incomplete rationality and perception errors regarding trip costs. Furthermore, to protect the privacy of both CSOs and EV users, a federated multi-agent deep reinforcement learning-based solution method is proposed to solve this problem. In this method, a non-profit aggregator is introduced to exchange neural network parameters among agents, enabling privacy-preserving and collaborative learning without sharing CSOs' data. Case studies on two test systems show that the proposed method achieves higher profits compared to existing algorithms.
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