Alberto Tarable;Rudi Paolo Paganelli;Elisabetta Storelli;Alberto Gatto;Marco Ferrari
{"title":"广义量子辅助数字签名","authors":"Alberto Tarable;Rudi Paolo Paganelli;Elisabetta Storelli;Alberto Gatto;Marco Ferrari","doi":"10.1109/TQE.2025.3595703","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces generalized quantum-assisted digital signature (GQaDS), an improved version of a recently proposed scheme whose information-theoretic security is inherited by adopting quantum key distribution keys for digital signature purposes. Its security against forging is computed considering a trial-and-error approach taken by the malicious forger, and GQaDS parameters are optimized via an analytical approach balancing between forgery and repudiation probabilities. The hash functions of the previous implementation are replaced with Carter–Wegman message authentication codes, strengthening the scheme security and reducing the signature length. For particular scenarios where the second verifier has a safe reputation, a simplified version of GQaDS, namely deterministic GQaDS, can further reduce the required signature length, keeping the desired security strength.","PeriodicalId":100644,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering","volume":"6 ","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=11112620","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Generalized Quantum-Assisted Digital Signature\",\"authors\":\"Alberto Tarable;Rudi Paolo Paganelli;Elisabetta Storelli;Alberto Gatto;Marco Ferrari\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TQE.2025.3595703\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article introduces generalized quantum-assisted digital signature (GQaDS), an improved version of a recently proposed scheme whose information-theoretic security is inherited by adopting quantum key distribution keys for digital signature purposes. Its security against forging is computed considering a trial-and-error approach taken by the malicious forger, and GQaDS parameters are optimized via an analytical approach balancing between forgery and repudiation probabilities. The hash functions of the previous implementation are replaced with Carter–Wegman message authentication codes, strengthening the scheme security and reducing the signature length. For particular scenarios where the second verifier has a safe reputation, a simplified version of GQaDS, namely deterministic GQaDS, can further reduce the required signature length, keeping the desired security strength.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100644,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering\",\"volume\":\"6 \",\"pages\":\"1-11\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-08-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=11112620\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11112620/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11112620/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article introduces generalized quantum-assisted digital signature (GQaDS), an improved version of a recently proposed scheme whose information-theoretic security is inherited by adopting quantum key distribution keys for digital signature purposes. Its security against forging is computed considering a trial-and-error approach taken by the malicious forger, and GQaDS parameters are optimized via an analytical approach balancing between forgery and repudiation probabilities. The hash functions of the previous implementation are replaced with Carter–Wegman message authentication codes, strengthening the scheme security and reducing the signature length. For particular scenarios where the second verifier has a safe reputation, a simplified version of GQaDS, namely deterministic GQaDS, can further reduce the required signature length, keeping the desired security strength.