{"title":"具有模$p$和阶$q$的综合对离散对数问题的shoror算法仿真","authors":"Kaito Kishi;Junpei Yamaguchi;Tetsuya Izu;Noboru Kunihiro","doi":"10.1109/TQE.2025.3591213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over finite fields, commonly used in classical cryptography, has no known polynomial-time algorithm on classical computers. However, Shor has provided its polynomial-time algorithm on quantum computers. Nevertheless, there are only few examples simulating quantum circuits that operate on general pairs of modulo <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and order <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>. In this article, we constructed such quantum circuits and solved DLPs for all 1860 possible pairs of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula> up to 32 qubits using a quantum simulator with PRIMEHPC FX700. From this, we obtained and verified values of the success probabilities, which had previously been heuristically analyzed by Ekerå (2019). As a result, the detailed waveform shape of the success probability of Shor's algorithm for solving the DLP, known as a periodic function of order <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>, was clarified. In addition, we generated 1015 quantum circuits for larger pairs of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>, extrapolated the circuit sizes obtained, and compared them for <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=2048$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits between safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups. While in classical cryptography, the cipher strength of safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups is the same if <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> is equal, we quantitatively demonstrated how much the strength of the latter decreases to the bit length of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> in the former when using Shor's quantum algorithm. In particular, it was experimentally and theoretically shown that when a basic adder is used in the addition circuit, the cryptographic strength of a Schnorr group with <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=2048$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits under Shor's algorithm is almost equivalent to that of a safe-prime group with <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=1024$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits.","PeriodicalId":100644,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering","volume":"6 ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=11087664","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Simulation of Shor Algorithm for Discrete Logarithm Problems With Comprehensive Pairs of Modulo $p$ and Order $q$\",\"authors\":\"Kaito Kishi;Junpei Yamaguchi;Tetsuya Izu;Noboru Kunihiro\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TQE.2025.3591213\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over finite fields, commonly used in classical cryptography, has no known polynomial-time algorithm on classical computers. However, Shor has provided its polynomial-time algorithm on quantum computers. Nevertheless, there are only few examples simulating quantum circuits that operate on general pairs of modulo <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and order <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>. In this article, we constructed such quantum circuits and solved DLPs for all 1860 possible pairs of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula> up to 32 qubits using a quantum simulator with PRIMEHPC FX700. From this, we obtained and verified values of the success probabilities, which had previously been heuristically analyzed by Ekerå (2019). As a result, the detailed waveform shape of the success probability of Shor's algorithm for solving the DLP, known as a periodic function of order <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>, was clarified. In addition, we generated 1015 quantum circuits for larger pairs of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math>$q$</tex-math></inline-formula>, extrapolated the circuit sizes obtained, and compared them for <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=2048$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits between safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups. While in classical cryptography, the cipher strength of safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups is the same if <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> is equal, we quantitatively demonstrated how much the strength of the latter decreases to the bit length of <inline-formula><tex-math>$p$</tex-math></inline-formula> in the former when using Shor's quantum algorithm. In particular, it was experimentally and theoretically shown that when a basic adder is used in the addition circuit, the cryptographic strength of a Schnorr group with <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=2048$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits under Shor's algorithm is almost equivalent to that of a safe-prime group with <inline-formula><tex-math>$p=1024$</tex-math></inline-formula> bits.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100644,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering\",\"volume\":\"6 \",\"pages\":\"1-12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=11087664\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11087664/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11087664/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Simulation of Shor Algorithm for Discrete Logarithm Problems With Comprehensive Pairs of Modulo $p$ and Order $q$
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over finite fields, commonly used in classical cryptography, has no known polynomial-time algorithm on classical computers. However, Shor has provided its polynomial-time algorithm on quantum computers. Nevertheless, there are only few examples simulating quantum circuits that operate on general pairs of modulo $p$ and order $q$. In this article, we constructed such quantum circuits and solved DLPs for all 1860 possible pairs of $p$ and $q$ up to 32 qubits using a quantum simulator with PRIMEHPC FX700. From this, we obtained and verified values of the success probabilities, which had previously been heuristically analyzed by Ekerå (2019). As a result, the detailed waveform shape of the success probability of Shor's algorithm for solving the DLP, known as a periodic function of order $q$, was clarified. In addition, we generated 1015 quantum circuits for larger pairs of $p$ and $q$, extrapolated the circuit sizes obtained, and compared them for $p=2048$ bits between safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups. While in classical cryptography, the cipher strength of safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups is the same if $p$ is equal, we quantitatively demonstrated how much the strength of the latter decreases to the bit length of $p$ in the former when using Shor's quantum algorithm. In particular, it was experimentally and theoretically shown that when a basic adder is used in the addition circuit, the cryptographic strength of a Schnorr group with $p=2048$ bits under Shor's algorithm is almost equivalent to that of a safe-prime group with $p=1024$ bits.