具有模$p$和阶$q$的综合对离散对数问题的shoror算法仿真

IF 4.6
Kaito Kishi;Junpei Yamaguchi;Tetsuya Izu;Noboru Kunihiro
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经典密码学中常用的有限域上的离散对数问题,在经典计算机上没有已知的多项式时间算法。然而,Shor已经在量子计算机上提供了多项式时间算法。然而,只有很少的例子模拟量子电路在模$p$和阶$q$的一般对上运行。在本文中,我们构建了这样的量子电路,并使用带有PRIMEHPC FX700的量子模拟器解决了所有1860对可能的$p$和$q$(最多32个量子位)的dlp。由此,我们获得并验证了成功概率的值,该值之前由eker(2019)进行了启发式分析。从而明确了求解DLP的Shor算法成功概率的详细波形形状,即阶为$q$的周期函数。此外,我们为较大的$p$和$q$对生成了1015个量子电路,外推了所获得的电路尺寸,并在安全素数组和Schnorr组之间比较了$p=2048$位。在经典密码学中,如果$p$相等,则安全素数群和Schnorr群的密码强度是相同的,我们定量地证明了在使用Shor量子算法时,后者的强度在前者中降低到$p$位长度的程度。特别是,实验和理论证明,当在加法电路中使用基本加法器时,在Shor算法下,$p=2048$ bits的Schnorr群的密码强度与$p=1024$ bits的安全素数群的密码强度几乎相等。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Simulation of Shor Algorithm for Discrete Logarithm Problems With Comprehensive Pairs of Modulo $p$ and Order $q$
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over finite fields, commonly used in classical cryptography, has no known polynomial-time algorithm on classical computers. However, Shor has provided its polynomial-time algorithm on quantum computers. Nevertheless, there are only few examples simulating quantum circuits that operate on general pairs of modulo $p$ and order $q$. In this article, we constructed such quantum circuits and solved DLPs for all 1860 possible pairs of $p$ and $q$ up to 32 qubits using a quantum simulator with PRIMEHPC FX700. From this, we obtained and verified values of the success probabilities, which had previously been heuristically analyzed by Ekerå (2019). As a result, the detailed waveform shape of the success probability of Shor's algorithm for solving the DLP, known as a periodic function of order $q$, was clarified. In addition, we generated 1015 quantum circuits for larger pairs of $p$ and $q$, extrapolated the circuit sizes obtained, and compared them for $p=2048$ bits between safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups. While in classical cryptography, the cipher strength of safe-prime groups and Schnorr groups is the same if $p$ is equal, we quantitatively demonstrated how much the strength of the latter decreases to the bit length of $p$ in the former when using Shor's quantum algorithm. In particular, it was experimentally and theoretically shown that when a basic adder is used in the addition circuit, the cryptographic strength of a Schnorr group with $p=2048$ bits under Shor's algorithm is almost equivalent to that of a safe-prime group with $p=1024$ bits.
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