{"title":"垄断是道德标准的有效制定者吗?","authors":"Yahel Giat, Eran Manes","doi":"10.1007/s10479-025-06600-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We propose a novel analytical framework to study the equilibrium determination of ethical standards when a boycott movement (BM) that represents ethically concerned consumers pressures producers to scale back the production of objectionable products, at the expense of other, ethically indifferent, consumer groups. Focusing on monopolies, we find that under a fixed price regime monopolies—depending on the price—are either over or under appeasing the BM. If monopolies are free to set the price and boycotters substitute ethical violations with price reductions, then monopolies’ distortionary effect is twofold: (i) they are less likely to appease the BM compared to the social planner, and (ii) whenever they choose to appease, they over appease relative to the social optimum. Our results provide theoretical foundations for why producers in industries with abnormal customer willingness to pay such as luxury brands, are less likely to appease. The results also suggest that managers can use pricing mechanisms to exploit ethical demands of their customers. Conversely, governments should consider the welfare loss to the remaining consumer base caused by this exploitation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":8215,"journal":{"name":"Annals of Operations Research","volume":"351 3","pages":"1803 - 1829"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are monopolies efficient setters of ethical standards?\",\"authors\":\"Yahel Giat, Eran Manes\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10479-025-06600-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We propose a novel analytical framework to study the equilibrium determination of ethical standards when a boycott movement (BM) that represents ethically concerned consumers pressures producers to scale back the production of objectionable products, at the expense of other, ethically indifferent, consumer groups. Focusing on monopolies, we find that under a fixed price regime monopolies—depending on the price—are either over or under appeasing the BM. If monopolies are free to set the price and boycotters substitute ethical violations with price reductions, then monopolies’ distortionary effect is twofold: (i) they are less likely to appease the BM compared to the social planner, and (ii) whenever they choose to appease, they over appease relative to the social optimum. Our results provide theoretical foundations for why producers in industries with abnormal customer willingness to pay such as luxury brands, are less likely to appease. The results also suggest that managers can use pricing mechanisms to exploit ethical demands of their customers. Conversely, governments should consider the welfare loss to the remaining consumer base caused by this exploitation.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":8215,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"volume\":\"351 3\",\"pages\":\"1803 - 1829\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-06-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-025-06600-0\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annals of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-025-06600-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Are monopolies efficient setters of ethical standards?
We propose a novel analytical framework to study the equilibrium determination of ethical standards when a boycott movement (BM) that represents ethically concerned consumers pressures producers to scale back the production of objectionable products, at the expense of other, ethically indifferent, consumer groups. Focusing on monopolies, we find that under a fixed price regime monopolies—depending on the price—are either over or under appeasing the BM. If monopolies are free to set the price and boycotters substitute ethical violations with price reductions, then monopolies’ distortionary effect is twofold: (i) they are less likely to appease the BM compared to the social planner, and (ii) whenever they choose to appease, they over appease relative to the social optimum. Our results provide theoretical foundations for why producers in industries with abnormal customer willingness to pay such as luxury brands, are less likely to appease. The results also suggest that managers can use pricing mechanisms to exploit ethical demands of their customers. Conversely, governments should consider the welfare loss to the remaining consumer base caused by this exploitation.
期刊介绍:
The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications.
In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.