董事会性别多样性和基于股权的薪酬

IF 3.8 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-08-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107538

Matthew Imes , Kose John , Kyeong Hun Lee , Amir Shoham , Emma Xu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了董事会性别多样性对高管薪酬中基于股权的薪酬的影响。我们的研究表明，女性董事的存在与高管薪酬中基于股权的薪酬较低有关——尤其是当女性董事在薪酬委员会任职或董事会由内部人士主导时。我们的研究结果支持这样一种观点，即女性董事是有效的监督者，可能取代其他公司治理机制，如基于激励的薪酬和董事会独立性。我们的业绩不是由股票表现不佳导致的较低的绩效薪酬敏感性驱动的。我们没有发现与女性董事规避风险相一致的证据。

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Board gender diversity and equity-based compensation

We examine the impact of board gender diversity on equity-based compensation in executive pay. We show that the presence of female directors is associated with lower equity-based compensation in executive pay—particularly when female directors serve on compensation committees or when boards are dominated by insiders. Our findings support the view that female directors serve as effective monitors, potentially substituting for other corporate governance mechanisms, such as incentive-based pay and board independence. Our results are not driven by lower pay-for-performance sensitivity induced by poor stock performance. We do not find evidence consistent with risk-aversion on the part of female directors.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.