基于两方进化博弈论的中国医疗联盟电子病历整合上下级医院合作竞争策略:混合方法研究

IF 3.8 3区 医学 Q2 MEDICAL INFORMATICS
Shenghu Tian, Rong Jiang, Jianfeng Yao, Yu Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

背景:医疗联合体以电子病历(EHR)集成为突破口,以构建一体化医疗服务体系为最终目标。然而,它们的建立打破了原有医疗秩序与利益格局之间的平衡。在促进医院间积极合作的同时,也加剧了医院间的积极竞争。目的:本研究旨在探讨医疗联合体上下级医院合作竞争策略的内部演化机制,为实现电子病历一体化提供理论基础和政策参考。方法:在分析合作竞争博弈主体结构及其博弈动机的基础上,建立演化博弈模型,分析关键参数的影响机制,利用MATLAB (MathWorks)模拟合作竞争策略的动态演化过程,最后提出可操作的政策建议。结果:结果表明,三个因素正向促进电子病历整合:(1)电子病历的互补性,(2)医院使用电子病历的意愿和能力,(3)单位电子病历的平均收益。相反,单位资源的投资成本阻碍了电子病历的整合。医院的原始收益和电子病历的存量对博弈系统的演化方向都没有显著影响。结论:医疗联合体应积极参与各级不同类型医疗机构,通过培训、协助、支持、医疗资源下沉等方式,不断提高医院使用电子病历的意愿和能力。政府应建立奖惩制度,优化医疗联合体的运行和监管机制,监控和惩罚“搭便车”等机会主义行为。加强医院信息化基础设施建设,完善电子病历建设的技术、内容和共享标准也是至关重要的。此外,设计基于“单位电子病历资源”的奖惩机制和成本核算对推进电子病历整合也具有重要意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Co-Opetition Strategies of Superior and Subordinate Hospitals for Integration of Electronic Health Records Within the Medical Consortiums in China Based on Two-Party Evolutionary Game Theory: Mixed Methods Study.

Co-Opetition Strategies of Superior and Subordinate Hospitals for Integration of Electronic Health Records Within the Medical Consortiums in China Based on Two-Party Evolutionary Game Theory: Mixed Methods Study.

Co-Opetition Strategies of Superior and Subordinate Hospitals for Integration of Electronic Health Records Within the Medical Consortiums in China Based on Two-Party Evolutionary Game Theory: Mixed Methods Study.

Background: Medical consortiums take the integration of electronic health records (EHR) as a breakthrough point and the construction of an integrated medical service system as the ultimate goal. However, their establishment has disrupted the balance between the original medical order and interest patterns. While promoting active cooperation among hospitals, it has also intensified active competition between them.

Objective: This study aimed to explore the internal evolution mechanism of the co-opetition strategies adopted by the superior and subordinate hospitals in the medical consortiums, providing a theoretical foundation and policy reference for achieving EHR integration.

Methods: On the basis of analyzing the structure of the main players in the co-opetition game and their game motivations, we established an evolutionary game model, analyzed the impact mechanism of key parameters, simulated the dynamic evolution process of the co-opetition strategies using MATLAB (MathWorks), and finally proposed actionable policy recommendations.

Results: The results indicate that three factors positively promote EHR integration: (1) EHR complementarity, (2) hospitals' willingness and ability to use EHR, and (3) the average revenue per unit of EHR. Conversely, the investment cost per unit of resources hinders EHR integration. Neither the original income of hospitals nor the stock of EHR significantly affects the evolution direction of the game system.

Conclusions: Medical consortiums should actively involve all levels and different types of medical institutions, and continuously improve hospitals' willingness and ability to use EHR through training, assistance, support, and sinking of medical resources, etc. The government should establish a reward and punishment system, optimize the operation and supervision mechanism of medical consortiums, and monitor and punish opportunism behaviors such as "free-riding." It is also crucial to strengthen the construction of hospital informatization infrastructure and improve the technical, content, and sharing standards for EHR construction. In addition, designing reward and punishment mechanisms as well as cost accounting based on "unit EHR resources" is also of great significance for promoting the EHR integration.

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来源期刊
JMIR Medical Informatics
JMIR Medical Informatics Medicine-Health Informatics
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
3.10%
发文量
173
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: JMIR Medical Informatics (JMI, ISSN 2291-9694) is a top-rated, tier A journal which focuses on clinical informatics, big data in health and health care, decision support for health professionals, electronic health records, ehealth infrastructures and implementation. It has a focus on applied, translational research, with a broad readership including clinicians, CIOs, engineers, industry and health informatics professionals. Published by JMIR Publications, publisher of the Journal of Medical Internet Research (JMIR), the leading eHealth/mHealth journal (Impact Factor 2016: 5.175), JMIR Med Inform has a slightly different scope (emphasizing more on applications for clinicians and health professionals rather than consumers/citizens, which is the focus of JMIR), publishes even faster, and also allows papers which are more technical or more formative than what would be published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research.
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