CEO自恋与股息政策

IF 6.9 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Moon Deok Park, Seung Hun Han, Chanhoo Song
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了CEO自恋对股利政策的影响。结果表明,ceo高度自恋的公司会支付更高的股息。对现金流和CEO薪酬的进一步分析表明,这种趋势不太可能是由信号动机驱动的。然而,利用有形性和买卖价差,我们观察到这种趋势是通过约束管理机会主义和激励ceo优先考虑股东利益来缓解代理冲突。本研究通过将公司的主要战略与其CEO特征联系起来,为文献做出了贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CEO narcissism and dividend policy
This study examines the effect of CEO narcissism on dividend policies. The results indicate that firms with highly narcissistic CEOs pay higher dividends. Additional analyses using cash flow and CEO pay slice reveal that this tendency is less likely to be driven by signaling motivation. However, using tangibility and bid-ask spread, we observe that this tendency is to mitigate agency conflicts by disciplining managerial opportunism and incentivizing CEOs to prioritize shareholders’ interests. This study contributes to literature by linking a firm’s major strategy to its CEO characteristics.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
9.20%
发文量
240
期刊介绍: Research in International Business and Finance (RIBAF) seeks to consolidate its position as a premier scholarly vehicle of academic finance. The Journal publishes high quality, insightful, well-written papers that explore current and new issues in international finance. Papers that foster dialogue, innovation, and intellectual risk-taking in financial studies; as well as shed light on the interaction between finance and broader societal concerns are particularly appreciated. The Journal welcomes submissions that seek to expand the boundaries of academic finance and otherwise challenge the discipline. Papers studying finance using a variety of methodologies; as well as interdisciplinary studies will be considered for publication. Papers that examine topical issues using extensive international data sets are welcome. Single-country studies can also be considered for publication provided that they develop novel methodological and theoretical approaches or fall within the Journal''s priority themes. It is especially important that single-country studies communicate to the reader why the particular chosen country is especially relevant to the issue being investigated. [...] The scope of topics that are most interesting to RIBAF readers include the following: -Financial markets and institutions -Financial practices and sustainability -The impact of national culture on finance -The impact of formal and informal institutions on finance -Privatizations, public financing, and nonprofit issues in finance -Interdisciplinary financial studies -Finance and international development -International financial crises and regulation -Financialization studies -International financial integration and architecture -Behavioral aspects in finance -Consumer finance -Methodologies and conceptualization issues related to finance
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