对冲基金的激进主义和美国银行的贷款损失拨备

IF 3.8 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-07-16 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107519

Dmytro Holod , Yuriy Kitsul , Gӧkhan Torna

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中，我们探讨了对冲基金积极分子（HFA）对不透明银行业管理决策的影响。专注于贷款损失准备金（llp），这是一个受到相当大的管理自由裁量权和各种监管机构审查的会计项目，我们发现hfa缓解了与银行贷款损失准备金决策相关的代理问题。研究结果表明，HFA的影响导致目标银行llp的高估大幅减少，而不是低估。这导致底线盈利能力和股票回报迅速增加，同时表明银行风险没有明显变化。我们得出的结论是，hfa的惩戒效应有助于股东价值，因为它导致了与LLP决策与目标银行股东利益的重新调整相一致的过度贷款损失拨备的减少。

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Hedge fund activism and loan loss provisioning in U.S. banks

In this study, we explore the hedge fund activist (HFA) influence on managerial decisions in the opaque banking industry. Focusing on loan loss provisions (LLPs), an accounting item that is subject to considerable managerial discretion as well as scrutiny from various regulatory agencies, we find that HFAs alleviate the agency problems associated with bank loan loss provisioning decisions. The findings show that HFA influence leads to a substantial reduction in overstatements, but not understatements, of LLPs at target banks. This results in a prompt increase in bottom-line profitability and stock returns, while pointing to no appreciable change in bank risk. We conclude that the disciplinary effect of HFAs contributes to shareholder value by leading to a reduction in excessive loan loss provisioning consistent with a realignment of LLP decisions with target bank shareholders’ interests.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.