{"title":"生命科学研究治理的可能转折点。","authors":"David R Gillum","doi":"10.1128/msphere.00407-25","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>On 5 May 2025, the White House issued Executive Order (EO) 14292, halting federally funded \"dangerous gain-of-function\" research and rescinding the 2024 Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP) policy. While intended to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, the EO introduces vague definitions, an abrupt 120-day policy development deadline, and politically charged rhetoric that could undermine trust and buy-in. Researchers, biosafety professionals, and institutions are left with a biosecurity policy vacuum after this EO, which is creating uncertainty across the scientific enterprise. This perspective considers the EO's implications through empirical findings and practitioner insight and argues for a tiered, adaptive risk governance model grounded in scientific rigor, operational clarity, and institutional expertise to navigate future biosecurity challenges.</p>","PeriodicalId":19052,"journal":{"name":"mSphere","volume":" ","pages":"e0040725"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A possible turning point for research governance in the life sciences.\",\"authors\":\"David R Gillum\",\"doi\":\"10.1128/msphere.00407-25\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>On 5 May 2025, the White House issued Executive Order (EO) 14292, halting federally funded \\\"dangerous gain-of-function\\\" research and rescinding the 2024 Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP) policy. While intended to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, the EO introduces vague definitions, an abrupt 120-day policy development deadline, and politically charged rhetoric that could undermine trust and buy-in. Researchers, biosafety professionals, and institutions are left with a biosecurity policy vacuum after this EO, which is creating uncertainty across the scientific enterprise. This perspective considers the EO's implications through empirical findings and practitioner insight and argues for a tiered, adaptive risk governance model grounded in scientific rigor, operational clarity, and institutional expertise to navigate future biosecurity challenges.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":19052,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"mSphere\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"e0040725\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"mSphere\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"99\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1128/msphere.00407-25\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"生物学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MICROBIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"mSphere","FirstCategoryId":"99","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1128/msphere.00407-25","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"生物学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MICROBIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
A possible turning point for research governance in the life sciences.
On 5 May 2025, the White House issued Executive Order (EO) 14292, halting federally funded "dangerous gain-of-function" research and rescinding the 2024 Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP) policy. While intended to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, the EO introduces vague definitions, an abrupt 120-day policy development deadline, and politically charged rhetoric that could undermine trust and buy-in. Researchers, biosafety professionals, and institutions are left with a biosecurity policy vacuum after this EO, which is creating uncertainty across the scientific enterprise. This perspective considers the EO's implications through empirical findings and practitioner insight and argues for a tiered, adaptive risk governance model grounded in scientific rigor, operational clarity, and institutional expertise to navigate future biosecurity challenges.
期刊介绍：
mSphere™ is a multi-disciplinary open-access journal that will focus on rapid publication of fundamental contributions to our understanding of microbiology. Its scope will reflect the immense range of fields within the microbial sciences, creating new opportunities for researchers to share findings that are transforming our understanding of human health and disease, ecosystems, neuroscience, agriculture, energy production, climate change, evolution, biogeochemical cycling, and food and drug production. Submissions will be encouraged of all high-quality work that makes fundamental contributions to our understanding of microbiology. mSphere™ will provide streamlined decisions, while carrying on ASM''s tradition for rigorous peer review.
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