与多家银行关系的债务重组

IF 3.8 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-07-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107503

Angelo Baglioni , Luca Colombo , Paola Rossi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

当陷入困境的公司的债务被分散时，由于搭便车，重组协议可能难以达成。我们开发了一个重复的游戏，在这个游戏中，银行经常遇到对方，如果搭便车，可能会受到惩罚。随着贷款银行数量的增加，再次遇到银行和因搭便车而受到惩罚的机会增加，从而提高了合作的可能性。通过观察陷入困境的意大利公司，我们发现估计的重组概率，以及财务困境产生积极结果的概率，随着银行数量的增加而增加，直至协调问题普遍存在的阈值。

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Debt restructuring with multiple bank relationships

When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement may be difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, and can threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks grows, the chance of meeting again a bank and of being punished for free riding increases, improving the likelihood of cooperation. Looking at Italian firms in distress, we find that the estimated restructuring probability, as well as the probability of a positive outcome of financial distress, increases with the number of banks up to a threshold beyond which coordination problems prevail.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.