一种新的网络物理系统级联故障集成负载重分配攻击模型

Rohini Haridas;Satish Sharma;Rohit Bhakar;Chenghong Gu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

负载重分配(LR)攻击对网络物理系统(CPS)的可靠性和安全性构成重大威胁,特别是在电力系统等关键基础设施中,可能引发级联故障。准确的建模对于全面理解这些攻击及其后果至关重要。这些攻击的现有模型通常将关键线路识别和利用作为单独的任务处理。这种隔离的方法可能会忽略攻击期间和应急后阶段的潮流变化,可能会影响对脆弱线路的准确识别。为了克服这一局限性,本文引入了一种新的集成LR攻击模型。该模型同时处理了关键线路的识别和利用,同时考虑了攻击期间和攻击后潮流的变化。这种方法有助于准确识别可能导致级联故障的关键线路。本研究中的发现,特别是从攻击者的角度来看,可以为开发健壮和安全的CPS做出重大贡献。使用改进的IEEE 14和IEEE 57总线系统验证了所提出的模型,证明了它能够通过针对单个关键线路在多条线路上诱导过载,从而导致级联故障。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Novel Integrated Load Redistribution Attack Model to Induce Cascading Failures in Cyber Physical Systems
Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker’s perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure.
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