{"title":"一种新的网络物理系统级联故障集成负载重分配攻击模型","authors":"Rohini Haridas;Satish Sharma;Rohit Bhakar;Chenghong Gu","doi":"10.1109/TICPS.2025.3585901","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker’s perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure.","PeriodicalId":100640,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems","volume":"3 ","pages":"454-463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Novel Integrated Load Redistribution Attack Model to Induce Cascading Failures in Cyber Physical Systems\",\"authors\":\"Rohini Haridas;Satish Sharma;Rohit Bhakar;Chenghong Gu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TICPS.2025.3585901\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker’s perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100640,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems\",\"volume\":\"3 \",\"pages\":\"454-463\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071350/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071350/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Novel Integrated Load Redistribution Attack Model to Induce Cascading Failures in Cyber Physical Systems
Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker’s perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure.