Maria José Gil-Moltó, Arne Risa Hole, Henrik Andersson, Geir Godager
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Recent research has found that health risk values elicited using Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) may be inadequately sensitive to the magnitude of the risk reduction, a phenomenon referred to as insensitivity to scope. This paper investigates the use of DCEs to estimate the value of a statistical life (VSL) under different experimental conditions. In particular, we use an experimental design where in one experimental arm we carry out a standard unincentivised DCE as in the existing literature, while in the other experimental arm we carry out an incentivized version of the DCE with real payments. Our findings suggest that the incentive has an impact on the results, in the sense that the VSL estimates are higher in the unincentivised arm of the experiment. However, we find evidence of external insensitivity to scope in both experimental arms and only weak evidence of stronger internal sensitivity to scope in the incentivized arm. Hence, our results suggest that a lack of scope sensitivity is unrelated to the hypothetical nature of the payments in stated-preference valuations of health risks.
期刊介绍:
This Journal publishes articles on all aspects of health economics: theoretical contributions, empirical studies and analyses of health policy from the economic perspective. Its scope includes the determinants of health and its definition and valuation, as well as the demand for and supply of health care; planning and market mechanisms; micro-economic evaluation of individual procedures and treatments; and evaluation of the performance of health care systems.
Contributions should typically be original and innovative. As a rule, the Journal does not include routine applications of cost-effectiveness analysis, discrete choice experiments and costing analyses.
Editorials are regular features, these should be concise and topical. Occasionally commissioned reviews are published and special issues bring together contributions on a single topic. Health Economics Letters facilitate rapid exchange of views on topical issues. Contributions related to problems in both developed and developing countries are welcome.