激励措施对评估健康风险的影响。

IF 2 3区 医学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Health economics Pub Date : 2025-07-12 DOI:10.1002/hec.70011
Maria José Gil-Moltó, Arne Risa Hole, Henrik Andersson, Geir Godager
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近的研究发现,使用离散选择实验(dce)得出的健康风险值可能对风险降低的幅度不够敏感,这种现象被称为对范围不敏感。本文研究了在不同实验条件下使用dce来估计统计寿命(VSL)的值。特别是,我们使用了一种实验设计,其中在一个实验臂中,我们执行现有文献中标准的无激励DCE,而在另一个实验臂中,我们执行具有真实付款的DCE的激励版本。我们的研究结果表明,激励对结果有影响,从某种意义上说,在没有激励的实验中,VSL估计更高。然而,我们在两个实验组中都发现了外部对范围不敏感的证据,而在激励组中只有微弱的证据表明内部对范围的敏感性更强。因此,我们的研究结果表明,范围敏感性的缺乏与健康风险的陈述偏好估值中支付的假设性质无关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of Incentives on Valuing Health Risks.

Recent research has found that health risk values elicited using Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) may be inadequately sensitive to the magnitude of the risk reduction, a phenomenon referred to as insensitivity to scope. This paper investigates the use of DCEs to estimate the value of a statistical life (VSL) under different experimental conditions. In particular, we use an experimental design where in one experimental arm we carry out a standard unincentivised DCE as in the existing literature, while in the other experimental arm we carry out an incentivized version of the DCE with real payments. Our findings suggest that the incentive has an impact on the results, in the sense that the VSL estimates are higher in the unincentivised arm of the experiment. However, we find evidence of external insensitivity to scope in both experimental arms and only weak evidence of stronger internal sensitivity to scope in the incentivized arm. Hence, our results suggest that a lack of scope sensitivity is unrelated to the hypothetical nature of the payments in stated-preference valuations of health risks.

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来源期刊
Health economics
Health economics 医学-卫生保健
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
4.80%
发文量
177
审稿时长
4-8 weeks
期刊介绍: This Journal publishes articles on all aspects of health economics: theoretical contributions, empirical studies and analyses of health policy from the economic perspective. Its scope includes the determinants of health and its definition and valuation, as well as the demand for and supply of health care; planning and market mechanisms; micro-economic evaluation of individual procedures and treatments; and evaluation of the performance of health care systems. Contributions should typically be original and innovative. As a rule, the Journal does not include routine applications of cost-effectiveness analysis, discrete choice experiments and costing analyses. Editorials are regular features, these should be concise and topical. Occasionally commissioned reviews are published and special issues bring together contributions on a single topic. Health Economics Letters facilitate rapid exchange of views on topical issues. Contributions related to problems in both developed and developing countries are welcome.
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