银行董事会结构和银团贷款

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-06-24 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107511

Lindsay Baran , Steven A. Dennis , Maneesh K. Shukla

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了银行董事会结构作为银团贷款信号机制的影响。我们发现，牵头安排人董事会的质量，特别是董事会的监督质量，对银团贷款的能力有积极影响。董事会质量的影响与首席编曲人的声誉是分开和不同的。当借款人和牵头安排人没有任何先前关系时，在现有借款人破产后，以及在金融危机期间，董事会监督质量发挥更重要的作用。我们假设我们的发现的一个渠道是通过董事会对CEO的监督，我们提供的证据表明，CEO质量部分中介董事会质量和银团贷款之间的关系。总体而言，我们得出结论，作为对声誉的独立而独特的影响，牵头行董事会的质量可以向参与银行发出可信的信号，减轻道德风险和逆向选择担忧。

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Bank board structure and loan syndication

We study the impact of bank board structure as a signaling mechanism in loan syndication. We find that the quality of the lead arranger’s board, and specifically the monitoring quality of the board, has a positive effect on the ability to syndicate a loan. The impact of board quality is separate and distinct from lead arranger reputation. Board monitoring quality plays a more important role when the borrower and lead arranger have no prior relationship, after the bankruptcy of an existing borrower, and during the financial crisis. We posit that one channel for our findings is through board oversight of the CEO, and we provide evidence that CEO quality partially mediates the relationship between board quality and loan syndication. Overall, we conclude the quality of the lead arranger’s board, as a separate and distinct effect to reputation, serves as a credible signal to participant banks, mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection concerns.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.