社交网络中移动众包的预算可行扩散机制

IF 9.2 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Xiang Liu;Weiwei Wu;Minming Li;Wanyuan Wang;Yifan Qin;Yingchao Zhao;Junzhou Luo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

移动众包已经成为组织利用一群用户的集体智慧来获得服务的一种流行方法。考虑到用户提供服务的成本,在预算约束下设计鼓励用户参与众包的激励机制至关重要。这与预算可行机制设计的概念是一致的。现有的预算可行机制往往假设用户可以立即获得并愿意加入众包,这是不现实的。为了解决这个问题,一个很有前途的方法是让参与的用户将拍卖信息传播给社交网络上的潜在用户。然而,这也带来了另一个挑战,即参与众包的用户可能是战略性的,因此不愿邀请更多潜在的竞争对手加入众包平台。在本文中,我们专注于开发扩散机制,激励战略用户通过社交网络积极传播拍卖信息。这有助于吸引更多知情的用户,并最终增加所采购服务的价值。具体来说,我们提出了最优的预算可行扩散机制,同时保证了个人理性、预算可行性、强预算平衡、激励兼容性(即用户报告实际成本并将拍卖信息扩散给所有邻居)和近似。在实际数据集上的实验结果进一步证明了该机制的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Budget-Feasible Diffusion Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsourcing in Social Networks
Mobile crowdsourcing has emerged as a popular approach for organizations to leverage the collective intelligence of a crowd of users to obtain services. Considering users’ costs for providing services, it is vital for the requester to design incentive mechanisms to encourage users’ participation in crowdsourcing under the budget constraint. This aligns with the concept of budget-feasible mechanism design. Existing budget-feasible mechanisms often assume immediate user reachability and willingness of joining the crowdsourcing, which is unrealistic. To address this issue, a promising approach is to have participating users diffuse auction information to potential users in the social network. However, this brings another challenge in that participating users can be strategic and therefore hesitant to invite more potential competitors to join the crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on developing diffusion mechanisms that incentivize strategic users to actively diffuse auction information through the social network. This helps to attract more informed users and ultimately increases the value of the procured services. Specifically, we propose optimal budget-feasible diffusion mechanisms that simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget-feasibility, strong budget-balance, incentive-compatibility (i.e., users report real costs and diffuse auction information to all their neighbors) and approximation. Experiment results under real datasets further demonstrate the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
403
审稿时长
6.6 months
期刊介绍: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing addresses key technical issues related to various aspects of mobile computing. This includes (a) architectures, (b) support services, (c) algorithm/protocol design and analysis, (d) mobile environments, (e) mobile communication systems, (f) applications, and (g) emerging technologies. Topics of interest span a wide range, covering aspects like mobile networks and hosts, mobility management, multimedia, operating system support, power management, online and mobile environments, security, scalability, reliability, and emerging technologies such as wearable computers, body area networks, and wireless sensor networks. The journal serves as a comprehensive platform for advancements in mobile computing research.
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