Xiang Liu;Weiwei Wu;Minming Li;Wanyuan Wang;Yifan Qin;Yingchao Zhao;Junzhou Luo
{"title":"社交网络中移动众包的预算可行扩散机制","authors":"Xiang Liu;Weiwei Wu;Minming Li;Wanyuan Wang;Yifan Qin;Yingchao Zhao;Junzhou Luo","doi":"10.1109/TMC.2025.3549751","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Mobile crowdsourcing has emerged as a popular approach for organizations to leverage the collective intelligence of a crowd of users to obtain services. Considering users’ costs for providing services, it is vital for the requester to design incentive mechanisms to encourage users’ participation in crowdsourcing under the budget constraint. This aligns with the concept of budget-feasible mechanism design. Existing budget-feasible mechanisms often assume immediate user reachability and willingness of joining the crowdsourcing, which is unrealistic. To address this issue, a promising approach is to have participating users diffuse auction information to potential users in the social network. However, this brings another challenge in that participating users can be strategic and therefore hesitant to invite more potential competitors to join the crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on developing diffusion mechanisms that incentivize strategic users to actively diffuse auction information through the social network. This helps to attract more informed users and ultimately increases the value of the procured services. Specifically, we propose optimal budget-feasible diffusion mechanisms that simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget-feasibility, strong budget-balance, incentive-compatibility (i.e., users report real costs and diffuse auction information to all their neighbors) and approximation. Experiment results under real datasets further demonstrate the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":50389,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing","volume":"24 8","pages":"7189-7205"},"PeriodicalIF":9.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Budget-Feasible Diffusion Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsourcing in Social Networks\",\"authors\":\"Xiang Liu;Weiwei Wu;Minming Li;Wanyuan Wang;Yifan Qin;Yingchao Zhao;Junzhou Luo\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TMC.2025.3549751\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Mobile crowdsourcing has emerged as a popular approach for organizations to leverage the collective intelligence of a crowd of users to obtain services. Considering users’ costs for providing services, it is vital for the requester to design incentive mechanisms to encourage users’ participation in crowdsourcing under the budget constraint. This aligns with the concept of budget-feasible mechanism design. Existing budget-feasible mechanisms often assume immediate user reachability and willingness of joining the crowdsourcing, which is unrealistic. To address this issue, a promising approach is to have participating users diffuse auction information to potential users in the social network. However, this brings another challenge in that participating users can be strategic and therefore hesitant to invite more potential competitors to join the crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on developing diffusion mechanisms that incentivize strategic users to actively diffuse auction information through the social network. This helps to attract more informed users and ultimately increases the value of the procured services. Specifically, we propose optimal budget-feasible diffusion mechanisms that simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget-feasibility, strong budget-balance, incentive-compatibility (i.e., users report real costs and diffuse auction information to all their neighbors) and approximation. Experiment results under real datasets further demonstrate the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":50389,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing\",\"volume\":\"24 8\",\"pages\":\"7189-7205\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":9.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10938284/\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10938284/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Budget-Feasible Diffusion Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsourcing in Social Networks
Mobile crowdsourcing has emerged as a popular approach for organizations to leverage the collective intelligence of a crowd of users to obtain services. Considering users’ costs for providing services, it is vital for the requester to design incentive mechanisms to encourage users’ participation in crowdsourcing under the budget constraint. This aligns with the concept of budget-feasible mechanism design. Existing budget-feasible mechanisms often assume immediate user reachability and willingness of joining the crowdsourcing, which is unrealistic. To address this issue, a promising approach is to have participating users diffuse auction information to potential users in the social network. However, this brings another challenge in that participating users can be strategic and therefore hesitant to invite more potential competitors to join the crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on developing diffusion mechanisms that incentivize strategic users to actively diffuse auction information through the social network. This helps to attract more informed users and ultimately increases the value of the procured services. Specifically, we propose optimal budget-feasible diffusion mechanisms that simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget-feasibility, strong budget-balance, incentive-compatibility (i.e., users report real costs and diffuse auction information to all their neighbors) and approximation. Experiment results under real datasets further demonstrate the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.
期刊介绍:
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing addresses key technical issues related to various aspects of mobile computing. This includes (a) architectures, (b) support services, (c) algorithm/protocol design and analysis, (d) mobile environments, (e) mobile communication systems, (f) applications, and (g) emerging technologies. Topics of interest span a wide range, covering aspects like mobile networks and hosts, mobility management, multimedia, operating system support, power management, online and mobile environments, security, scalability, reliability, and emerging technologies such as wearable computers, body area networks, and wireless sensor networks. The journal serves as a comprehensive platform for advancements in mobile computing research.