董事会中的金融监管者：来自盈余信息质量的证据

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

European Financial Management Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI:10.1111/eufm.12530

Ching-Hung Chang, Yung-Ling Chi, Qingqing Wu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现具有金融监管背景的董事与较低的盈余质量相关。金融监管董事（frd）的影响对于拥有较高专有成本的公司和拥有更多专业知识和经验的公司更为显著。FRD公司没有更大的可能性出现财务不当行为或达到或超过分析师的预测。与任命其他董事相比，股市对FRD任命的反应更为积极。我们的研究结果表明，frd证明了公司纪律，较低的盈余质量反映了战略选择，而不是机会主义操纵，突出了金融监管机构离职后限制的影响。

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Financial Regulators on Boards: Evidence From Earnings Information Quality

We find that directors with a financial regulatory background are associated with lower earnings quality. The influence of financial regulatory directors (FRDs) is more substantial for firms with higher proprietary costs and FRDs with greater expertise and experience. FRD firms do not have a greater likelihood of financial misconduct or meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. The stock market reacts more positively to FRD appointments than to the appointments of other directors. Our findings suggest that FRDs certify firm discipline, with lower earnings quality reflecting strategic choices rather than opportunistic manipulation, highlighting the impact of postemployment restrictions in financial regulatory agencies.

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来源期刊

European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

18.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.