基于股权的高管薪酬和赛事激励

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

European Financial Management Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI:10.1111/eufm.12533

Meziane Lasfer, Xiaoke Ye

{"title":"基于股权的高管薪酬和赛事激励","authors":"Meziane Lasfer, Xiaoke Ye","doi":"10.1111/eufm.12533","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We find that the losers in CEO promotion tournaments sell their equity holdings profitably to mitigate the reductions in the promotion-based component of their contracts. They avoid selling before losing the contest to maximize their promotion probabilities. Those who are more likely to compete in the tournament and to face a greater forgone tournament prize trade more aggressively. Our results suggest that tournament losers consider their trading opportunities as outside options to compensate themselves ex-post. This strategy weakens the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance and highlights new implications for tournament incentives models, compensation committees, and insider trading regulations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47815,"journal":{"name":"European Financial Management","volume":"31 3","pages":"1015-1041"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/eufm.12533","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Executive Equity-Based Compensation and Tournament Incentives\",\"authors\":\"Meziane Lasfer, Xiaoke Ye\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/eufm.12533\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We find that the losers in CEO promotion tournaments sell their equity holdings profitably to mitigate the reductions in the promotion-based component of their contracts. They avoid selling before losing the contest to maximize their promotion probabilities. Those who are more likely to compete in the tournament and to face a greater forgone tournament prize trade more aggressively. Our results suggest that tournament losers consider their trading opportunities as outside options to compensate themselves ex-post. This strategy weakens the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance and highlights new implications for tournament incentives models, compensation committees, and insider trading regulations.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47815,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Financial Management\",\"volume\":\"31 3\",\"pages\":\"1015-1041\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/eufm.12533\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Financial Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eufm.12533\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eufm.12533","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现，在CEO晋升比赛中的失败者出售他们的股权获利，以减轻其合同中基于晋升的部分的减少。他们在输掉竞争之前避免销售，以最大化他们的推广概率。那些更有可能在比赛中竞争并面临更大的放弃比赛奖金的人更积极地交易。我们的研究结果表明，比赛失败者将他们的交易机会视为事后补偿自己的外部选择。这一策略削弱了赛事激励与公司绩效之间的关系，并突出了赛事激励模型、薪酬委员会和内幕交易监管的新含义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Executive Equity-Based Compensation and Tournament Incentives

We find that the losers in CEO promotion tournaments sell their equity holdings profitably to mitigate the reductions in the promotion-based component of their contracts. They avoid selling before losing the contest to maximize their promotion probabilities. Those who are more likely to compete in the tournament and to face a greater forgone tournament prize trade more aggressively. Our results suggest that tournament losers consider their trading opportunities as outside options to compensate themselves ex-post. This strategy weakens the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance and highlights new implications for tournament incentives models, compensation committees, and insider trading regulations.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

18.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.