建立一个欧盟“财政部”:解释欧盟委员会对债务发行和管理的新方法

IF 3.3 1区 社会学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Lukas Spielberger, Dermot Hodson, David Howarth, Iacopo Mugnai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了欧盟委员会(European Commission)如何从上世纪70年代资本市场的偶尔参与者,转变为本世纪20年代的老牌债券发行人。这些变化的结果是,欧盟委员会已从使用多种融资工具进行背靠背贷款的传统模式,转向以欧洲国债的方式定期发行欧盟债券和票据。使用委托代理方法,我们询问这种转变是由寻求从集体借贷中获益的成员国推动的,还是由旨在促进欧洲一体化的欧盟委员会(European Commission)的失误推动的。我们的研究结果表明,欧盟委员会偶尔试图推进更广泛的政治目标,但遭到了成员国的拒绝,尽管如此,这些成员国最终还是接受了建立欧洲财政部的想法。我们的研究结果强调,在欧盟作为借款国的演变过程中,授权优于机构松弛的逻辑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Building a European Union ‘Treasury’: Explaining the European Commission's New Approach to Debt Issuance and Management

This article examines how the European Commission went from being an occasional participant in capital markets in the 1970s to an established bond issuer by the 2020s. As a result of these changes, the Commission has moved away from its traditional model of back-to-back lending using a wide array of funding instruments towards the regular issuance of EU bonds and bills in the style of a European treasury. Using a principal–agent approach, we ask whether this shift was driven by member states seeking to reap the benefits of collective borrowing or rather by slippage by the Commission aimed at spurring European integration. Our results show that the Commission's occasional attempts to advance wider political objectives were rebuffed by member states, which, nonetheless, ultimately embraced the idea of a European treasury. Our findings emphasise the logic of delegation over agency slack when it comes to the EU's evolution as a borrower.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
18.20%
发文量
137
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